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Notes
WHICH COMES FIRST IN FEDERAL COURT, THE CHICKEN OR
THE BABY CHICKS?: THE UNAVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL
REMEDIES FOR SPOUSAL CONSORTIUM
CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
I. INTRODUCTION
A line in a popular nursery rhyme sung by many school-age children
is "First comes love, then comes marriage, then comes baby in a baby car-
riage."' While third graders can readily identify this seemingly obvious
chronology, a number of federal courts find the concept to be considera-
bly more difficult.2 The difficulty federal courts have is reflected in statu-
tory readings and case law affording higher protection to the parent-child
relationship than the relationship between spouses.
3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit lies at the
center of this debate. 4 Even though this court held in 1985 that a parent
can bring a claim for loss of consortium under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 5 the same
court expressly declined to consider the question of whether a spouse can
bring an analogous claim for loss of consortium under the same statute in
1. See Scott Miller, Short Poems: Selecting A Mate 1, http://www.skunkwks.com/
web/stories/life-for rent/vulpine.poetry.php (listing common nursery rhymes)
(last modified Dec. 5, 2005); cf. Starr Taunts Clinton with Humiliating 'Sittin' in a
Tree' Song, THE ONION, Oct. 28, 1998, available at http://www.theonion.com/con-
tent/node/31943?issue=4227&special=1998 (showing rhyme to be so well known
that it is foundation for popular culture parody).
2. See, e.g., Norcross v. Town of Hammonton, Civil No. 04-2536 (RBK), 2006
WL 1995021, at *3 (D.N.J. July 13, 2006) (holding no constitutional right to
spousal consortium and thus no standing for spouse to assert loss of consortium
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). For analysis of the illogical result that occurs when
federal courts find that parent-child relationships have federal remedies under
Section 1983 but spousal relationships do not, see infra notes 109-46 and accompa-
nying text.
3. See, e.g., Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 605-07 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding
no constitutional right to spousal consortium because Supreme Court has only
recognized constitutional right to familial relations in parent-child context). For
an in-depth discussion of courts that give a restrictive reading of authoritative Su-
preme Court case law, so as to find the parent-child relationship constitutionally
protected while the spousal relationship is not, see infra notes 36-81 and accompa-
nying text.
4. For a discussion of the conflicting district court views within the Third Cir-
cuit regarding the status of spousal consortium claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see
infra notes 43-50, 94-105 and accompanying text.
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2007).
(569)
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1993.6 This issue has continued to incite debate among district courts
within the circuit.
7
For many people, falling in love, getting married and then having
children would be ideal, although every person knows that they will en-
counter challenges as a spouse and as a parent because serious responsibil-
ities accompany each role.8 In recognition of the emotional, moral and
legal responsibilities people undertake as spouses and parents, legal reme-
dies are available to individuals when government action interferes with
these relationships. 9
The traditional family chronology dictates that a man and a woman
should fall in love and then get married, thereby becoming spouses. 10
6. See Livingstone v. N. Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205, 1215 n.10 (3d
Cir. 1993) (stating "[defendants] contend that... Mr. Livingstone's claim for loss
of consortium is not recognized under [S]ection 1983 . . . [and w]e do not con-
sider [this] argument"); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 509 n.7
(3d Cir. 1985) (holding that father could bring claim for loss of consortium of his
child under Section 1983 because he had cognizable liberty interest in preserving
life of his child).
7. Compare Norcross, 2006 WL 1995021, at *3 (holding that no constitutional
right to spousal consortium exists, thus spouses do not have standing to assert loss
of consortium claim under Section 1983), and Colbum v. City of Phila., No. CIV.
A. 00-2781, 2001 WL 872960, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2001) (same); Wiers v.
Barnes, 925 F. Supp. 1079, 1095-96 (D. Del. 1996) (same); Verde v. City of Phila.,
862 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (same), with Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp.,
227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 381-82 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that fundamental rights ex-
isting in Third Circuit between parents and children under decisions like Bailey
logically extend to spouses, so spouses can assert loss of consortium claim under
Section 1983).
8. See, e.g., Katherine Bartlett, Saving the Family from Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 809, 815 (1998) (arguing that marriage is still considered to be "an important
ideal" even in modern day society); Twila L. Perry, The "Essentials of Marriage": Re-
considering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 1, 37 (2003) ("In
our society, marriage is the form of intimate relationship between a man and a
woman that is accorded the highest level of respect.").
9. SeeJohnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 222 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that
cause of action for wrongful death may be brought by surviving spouse, children or
parents because of inherent close nature of such family relationships under Texas
law); McIntyre v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 2d 54, 113-16 (D. Mass. 2006) (hold-
ing that mother was proper claimant under wrongful death statute for death of
son); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 921-22 (Cal. 1968) (holding that bystander
could maintain cause of action for physical injuries flowing from emotional trauma
of witnessing negligent injury, where bystander and plaintiff are closely related,
such as spouses or children). Additionally, for discussion of the availability of the
traditional loss of consortium claim in both the spousal and parent-child context,
see infra notes 112-26 and accompanying text.
10. See Nat'l Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Idea House, Status of the "Traditional Fam-
ily," http://www.ncpa.org/pd/social/spmay98d.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007)
(citing Joyce Howard Price, Traditional Family Nowhere Near Extinct, WASH. TIMES,
May 28, 1998, at All) (finding that while number of married couples with minor
children is declining, they still account for 35.7% of all American households); see
also TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARRIED-COUPLE
AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000 10 (Feb. 2003), www.census.gov/
[Vol. 52: p. 569
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The couple then decides to have children and become parents." While it
is unlikely that an individual would find either role as spouse or parent
more important than the other, biology and the nature of traditional rela-
tionships generally involve a person becoming a spouse before taking on
the role of parent. 12 In this respect, the spousal relationship is the life-
blood of its parental counterpart. 13
Legally, the state law claim for loss of spousal consortium has natu-
rally given rise to the more contemporary claim for loss of parental consor-
tium. 14 The loss of spousal consortium claim is a traditional and common
one; yet, it has undergone significant change throughout time.' 5 This
cause of action has morphed from its origin as an economic damages
claim brought only by husbands, to a more emotionally based claim
brought by both husbands and wives. 16
prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf (representing that of United States's 105.5 million
households, 52% were maintained by married couples).
11. See SIMMONS & O'CONNELL, supra note 10 (stating that nationally, 46% of
married-couple households had at least one son or daughter living within
household).
12. See Miller, supra note 1 (listing popular children's nursery rhyme about
traditional family chronology); see also SIMMONS & O'CONNELL, supra note 10 (not-
ing common chronology of American families).
13. For a discussion of the history of common law spousal consortium claims
giving rise to the relatively new parental consortium claims, see infra notes 109-26
and accompanying text.
14. See Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495, 497-99 (Wis. 1975) (finding that
"the common law rule [where loss of consortium does not exist in the parent-child
relationship] no longer fits the social realities of the present day," such that rule
allowing parents to recover for loss of consortium of their children is "closer to our
present day family ideal"). For further discussion of the history of the loss of pa-
rental consortium claim, see infra notes 109-26 and accompanying text.
15. See Perry, supra note 8, at 37 (noting that history of common law claim for
loss of consortium was substantiated long before tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
16. SeeJohnny Parker, Parental Consortium: Assessing the Contours of the New Tort
in Town, 64 Miss. L.J. 37, 38-39 (1994) (discussing English common law cases such
as Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (Ex. Ch. 1861)). Parker chronicles the
early cases discussing the common law claim of loss of consortium. See id. (follow-
ing early American construction of English common law, resulting in loss of con-
sortium actions encompassing only economic damages belonging solely to
husband, not emotional loss). These opinions were construed as giving men only
the right to sue for loss of consortium, which included merely damages for loss of
services; emotional damages to the spousal relationship were not recognized as
actionable. See id. (explaining that until 1950 wives had no standing to sue for loss
of spousal consortium). Eventually, loss of consortium claims expanded to allow
women to bring suits on behalf of themselves. See, e.g., Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,
183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (recognizing wife's right to bring loss of consor-
tium claim), overruled in part by Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 226 (D.C. Cir.
1957) (overruling Hitaffer "insofar as it applied to Section 5 of the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Act"). Loss of spousal consortium dates back to early com-
mon law, recognizing at first only the economic and sexual interest a man had in
his wife. See Parker, supra, at 39 (discussing early American loss of consortium as
arising from similar claim at English common law). The Hitaffer court was, in fact,
the first federal court in the United States to allow a woman to bring a loss of
3
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Similar to many major additions to substantive legal rights and reme-
dies that have occurred throughout history, courts refused to recognize
claims for loss of parental consortium. 17 Ultimately, the argument that
the emotional importance of parent-child relationships is equal to that of
spousal relationships persuaded courts to grant equal legal rights to the
parent-child relationship. 18 Thus, after decades of advocacy, the spousal
consortium claim. See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 819 (finding no compelling argument
for maintaining standing restriction and, thus, holding wife can bring loss of con-
sortium claim). In doing so, the court relied heavily on the marriage relationship
itself and the benefits each spouse derives from it equally, rather than the eco-
nomic resources each spouse brings to the other:
The actual injury to the wife from loss of consortium, which is the basis of
the action, is the same as the actual injury to the husband from that
cause. His right to the conjugal society of his wife is no greater than her
right to the conjugal society of her husband. Marriage gives each the
same rights in that regard. Each is entitled to the comfort, companion-
ship and affection of the other. The rights of one and the obligations of
the other spring from the marriage contract, are mutual in character,
and attach to the husband as husband and wife as wife. Any interference
with these rights, whether of the husband or of the wife, is a violation, not
only of a natural right, but also of a legal right arising out of the marriage
relation.... As the wrongs of the wife are the same in principle, and are
caused by acts of the same nature, as those of the husband, the remedy
should be the same.
Id. at 816 (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 23 N.E. 17, 18-19 (N.Y. 1889)) (noting
mutual rights of spouses).
17. See Perry, supra note 8, at 37 (finding that, as of 2003, expanding loss of
consortium claim to parent-child relationship is still recent development). In de-
clining to extend the loss of consortium claim to parents and children, many juris-
dictions cited an absence of statutory law. See, e.g., Smith v. Richardson, 171 So. 2d
96, 100 (Ala. 1965) (finding that loss of society of injured child is distinguished
from loss of child's services in Alabama statute, thus loss of child's society cannot
form element of damages recoverable by parent); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d
812, 817 (Miss. 1972) (holding father not entitled to recover damages for loss of
consortium of his daughter because Mississippi statute does not provide for such
recovery); Gilbert v. Santon Brewery, 67 N.E.2d 155, 157 (N.Y. 1946) (holding that
infant's mother was entitled to recover damages from defendant measured by pe-
cuniary loss mother sustained, but was not entitled to be compensated for loss of
companionship because companionship of child is not element of damage under
New York statute); Kalsow v. Grob, 237 N.W. 848, 849 (N.D. 1931) (finding that
father cannot recover for loss of consortium of child injured in car accident under
North Dakota statute), overruled by Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1988)
("[O]ne may recover damages for loss of society, comfort and companionship in
an action for the wrongful death of a child."); Quinn v. City of Pittsburgh, 90 A.
353, 354 (Pa. 1914) (holding that loss of companionship is not element of damage
in action by mother for injuries to her minor child); McGarr v. Nat'l & Providence
Worsted Mills, 53 A. 320, 326 (R.I. 1902) (finding that in action by parent to re-
cover for loss of services of minor, damages cannot be awarded for loss of society of
minor). For discussion of the history of the claim for loss of parental consortium
as a substantive expansion of the common law loss of spousal consortium claim,
see infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
18. See Shockley, 225 N.W.2d at 497 (holding that loss of consortium claims can
be brought by parents for loss of their children's society because they are more
accurate gauge of modern-day relationship between parents and children); see also
Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 994-97 (Alaska 1987) (hold-
4
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tium within the last twenty years.
19
ing that minor children had independent cause of action for loss of parental con-
sortium resulting from injuries tortiously inflicted on their parent by third party);
Villareal v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 216-20 (Ariz. 1989) (finding that
child can bring loss of consortium claim resulting from father's death in motorcy-
cle accident); Frank v. Superior Court of Ariz., 722 P.2d 955, 958-59 (Ariz. 1986)
(finding that parents have cause of action for loss of consortium under Arizona law
against third party who injures their adult child); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259,
270 (Iowa 1981) (holding that minor has independent cause of action in Iowa for
loss of companionship of parent who is tortiously injured by third party so as to
cause significant disruption of parent-child relationship), overruled by Audubon-Ex-
ira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Iowa 1983)
(limiting child's damages claim for loss of parental consortium to period of child's
minority); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 425 (Mich. 1981) (finding that child
has independent cause of action for loss of parental consortium when parent is
negligently injured); Lester v. Sayles 850 S.W.2d 858, 871 (Mo. 1993) (holding
most important consideration in calculating damages owed to mother when
daughter was injured in train accident was mother's deprivation of enjoyment of
daughter's consortium); Keele v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 852 P.2d
574, 576-78 (Mont. 1993) (holding that in Montana, minor child can establish
claim for loss of parental consortium by showing mental or physical impairment in
parent so severe that it causes parent-child relationship to be destroyed or nearly
destroyed); Davis v. Elizabeth Gen. Med. Ctr., 548 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1988) (holding that parents were entitled to award of $50,000 for loss of child's
consortium under New Jersey law), overruled by Tynan v. Curzi, 753 A.2d 187 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (overruling Davis insofar as it extends parents' right to
recovery "beyond that permitted by common law"); Gallimore v. Children's Hosp.
Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (Ohio 1993) (holding that parent may recover
damages in action against third party who causes physical injury to parent's minor
child, for loss of consortium); Norvell v. Cuyahoga County Hosp., 463 N.E.2d 111,
114-15 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (holding that parents of injured minor child may
recover compensation for loss of child's consortium); Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d
1131, 1133-38 (Okla. 1990) (holding that minor children or incapacitated depen-
dent children may maintain cause of action for permanent loss of parental consor-
tium when third party injures parent); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 465-66
(Tex. 1990) (holding that children may recover for loss of parental consortium
when third party causes disabling injuries to their parent); Hay v. Med. Ctr. Hosp.,
496 A.2d 939, 946 (Vt. 1985) (finding that minor child has right to sue for dam-
ages for loss of parental consortium); Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp., 864
P.2d 921, 932-33 (Wash. 1993) (holding mother's recovery of damages appropriate
because impact of son's medical injuries on mother-son relationship); Ueland v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 195 (Wash. 1984) (expanding loss of consor-
tium claim so that child has independent right of action for loss of parent's consor-
tium); Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830, 841 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that any
minor or physically or mentally handicapped child who is dependent on parent
may maintain cause of action for loss or impairment of parental consortium
against third party); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797
P.2d 1171, 1176 (Wyo. 1990) (finding that minor children have independent claim
for loss of parental consortium resulting from injuries tortiously inflicted on their
parents by third person). But see Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Schultz, 855 A.2d 753,
755 (Pa. 2004) (finding no right to assert loss of parental consortium under Penn-
sylvania law).
19. See Shockley, 225 N.W.2d at 497 (finding that "the common law rule no
longer fits the social realities of the present day"). Wisconsin was one of the first
jurisdictions to recognize a right to parental consortium, and did so largely by
2007] NOTE
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Suprisingly, though, federal courts have been more willing to recog-
nize the loss of parental consortium claim rather than the loss of spousal
consortium claim. 20 This anomalous result can be observed in claims as-
serted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.21 Under Section 1983,
emphasizing the modern day dynamics of the parent-child relationship and simi-
larities therein to the spousal relationship. See id. at 499 ("Society and companion-
ship between parents and their children are closer to our present day family ideal
than the right of the parents to the 'earning capacity during minority,' which once
seemed so important when the common law was originally established."). In rec-
ognizing an actionable remedy for loss of parental consortium, courts have neces-
sarily had to recognize that consortium is a great deal more than sexual services.
See, e.g., Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977) ("Certain aspects
of spousal relationship are similar to those of the parent-child relationship." (quot-
ing Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 746 (1975))); Still v. Baptist Hosp., Inc.,
755 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) ("When the vitally important parent-
child relationship is impaired and the child loses the love, guidance and close
companionship of a parent, the child is deprived of something that is indeed valu-
able and precious. No one could seriously contend otherwise."). Many jurisdic-
tions have subsequently followed suit in the past two decades. See, e.g., Frank, 722
P.2d at 958-59 (finding that under Arizona law, parents have cause of action for
loss of consortium against third party who negligently injured their adult child);
Lester, 850 S.W.2d at 871 (holding that most important consideration in calculating
damages owed to mother when daughter was injured in train accident was
mother's deprivation of enjoyment of daughter's consortium); Davis, 548 A.2d at
532 (holding that parents, whose child suffered severe permanent brain damage,
were entitled to award of $50,000 for loss of child's consortium during child's mi-
nority under NewJersey law); Gallimore, 617 N.E.2d at 1057 (holding that parent
may recover damages for loss of consortium, including loss of child's services, soci-
ety, companionship, comfort, love and solace); Norvel 463 N.E.2d at 114-15
(holding that parents of minor child injured by tortfeasor's negligence may re-
cover compensation for loss of child's consortium); Adcox, 864 P.2d at 932-33
(holding recovery of damages by mother appropriate because of devastating im-
pact son's medical injuries had on mother-son relationship).
20. See Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 509 n.7 (3d Cir. 1985)
(holding that father of child whose civil rights were violated had "cognizable lib-
erty interest in preserving the life and physical safety of his child from deprivations
caused by state action, a right that logically extends from his recognized liberty
interest in the custody of his children and the maintenance and integrity of the
family," as interest described by Supreme Court opinions such as Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (holding that children have right to assert claims for loss of parents' con-
sortium); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1237 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that parent whose child died as result of unlawful state action may maintain action
under Section 1983 for deprivation of liberty), overruled by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d
783 (7th Cir. 2005) (overruling Bell "insofar as it recognized a constitutional right
to recover for the loss of companionship of an adult child when that relationship is
terminated as an incidental result of state action"). But see Harbury v. Deutch, 233
F.3d 596, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding no constitutional right to spousal consor-
tium as sanctioned by Supreme Court, because Court has only recognized constitu-
tional right to familial relations in parent-child context); Stallworth v. City of
Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830, 838 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding no constitutional right to
spousal consortium explicitly sanctioned by Supreme Court).
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2007).
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, or any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. 2 2
Many district and circuit courts have found a right for a parent to
claim loss of consortium under Section 1983; yet, serious controversy re-
mains over whether a spouse has the right to claim loss of consortium
under the same federal statutory provision. 23 This controversy turns on
whether the person bringing the loss of consortium claim has suffered a
22. Id. The rights to have children and raise them without undue govern-
mental interference have long been considered protected by the Due Process
Clause, and as such, parents have been able to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for loss of parental consortium. See, e.g., Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 509 n.7 (hold-
ing that father of child beaten to death by mother's boyfriend had "cognizable
liberty interest in preserving the life and physical safety of his child from depriva-
tions caused by state action, a right that logically extends from his recognized lib-
erty interest in the custody of his children and the maintenance and integrity of
the family"); Bell, 746 F.2d at 1205 (holding that parent whose child died as result
of unlawful state action may maintain claim for deprivation of liberty under Sec-
tion 1983). For this reason, circuit courts generally do not have difficulty recogniz-
ing a right for a parent to sue for loss of parental consortium under Section 1983
because the Supreme Court has framed a parent's constitutional right specifically
as the right to have and to raise children without undue government interference.
See, e.g., Harbury, 233 F.3d at 605 (finding that Supreme Court has only ever recog-
nized constitutional right to familial relations in parent-child context); Estate of
Bailey, 768 F.2d at 509 n.7 (holding that parent has constitutional liberty interest in
life of his or her child); Bell, 746 F.2d at 1205 (finding that parents can bring claim
for loss of their child's consortium under Section 1983).
23. See, e.g., Harbury, 233 F.3d at 605 (finding no constitutional right to
spousal consortium as sanctioned by Supreme Court, because Court has only ever
recognized constitutional right to familial relations in parent-child context); Stall-
worth, 893 F.2d at 838 (finding no constitutional right to spousal consortium sanc-
tioned by Supreme Court). As a direct consequence of courts' failure to find a
constitutional right to spousal consortium, these same courts hold that spouses
have no right or ability to bring loss of consortium claims under Section 1983. See,
e.g., Harbury, 233 F.3d at 605 (dismissing spouse's claim for loss of consortium
under Section 1983 on summary judgment); Stallworth, 893 F.2d at 838 (dismissing
loss of consortium claim brought under Section 1983 for failure to state claim
upon which relief can be granted); see also Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 804-05 (4th
Cir. 1994) (following First Circuit version of due process violation claim for loss of
family member, in which plaintiff must show state action directly injures relation-
ship itself); Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1986) (requiring plaintiff to
show direct, intentional interference with relationship in order to find due process
violation, even though right of familial relationships to be free from undue govern-
mental interference is protected by Constitution). But see Flores v. Cameron
County, 92 F.3d 258, 271 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that parent can bring actionable
loss of consortium claim under Section 1983 based on substantive state law, al-
lowing for future possibility of spouses to bring similar claims because Texas state
law allows such loss of consortium claims to be brought by spouses).
7
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deprivation of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws." 24 Many
courts have therefore concluded that parents' rights to the consortium of
their children are constitutionally protected, while spouses' analogous
rights to the consortium of their spouse are not. 25 These courts have
reached this disparate conclusion despite the plethora of Supreme Court
case law holding that the marriage relationship is constitutionally
protected.
2 6
24. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
25. See Norcross v. Town of Hammonton, Civil No. 04-2536 (RBK), 2006 WL
1995021, at *3 (D.N.J. July 13, 2006) (finding parent's right to consortium of child
constitutionally protected but spouse's analogous right is not). Due to the specific-
ity with which the Supreme Court has delineated the rights a person holds as a
parent, namely the rights to have and raise children without undue interference,
the idea of a loss of parental consortium claim brought under Section 1983 is not
very problematic. See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 ("It is plain that the interest of a
parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her chil-
dren comes to this Court with a momentum of respect." (internal quotations omit-
ted)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose pri-
mary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
634-35 (1943) (holding that parents have constitutional right to give their children
religious training and encourage them to practice it); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 532 (1925) (finding that state requirement compelling children to at-
tend public school is unconstitutional because parents have constitutional right to
choose their child's schooling under Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (holding that parents have constitutional right to raise
their children without government interference, including choosing primary lan-
guage child speaks). Courts have made it particularly clear that when relationships
with minor children are at stake, state action at issue in a Section 1983 claim can
cause undue government interference with a parent's right to have and raise his or
her child. See Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 509 n.7 (holding that parent has cogniza-
ble liberty interest in protecting life of one's minor child); Bell, 746 F.2d at 1245
(same). Ironically, the broad protection the Supreme Court has historically af-
forded the marriage relationship seems to have in fact made it more difficult for a
spouse to recover loss of consortium under Section 1983. See, e.g., Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding constitutionally mandated realm of
privacy that protects marriage relationship); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205,
211 (1888) (describing marriage as "the most important relation in life" and "the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress"). For a further discussion of the difficulty some courts
have in finding constitutional protection for loss of spousal consortium claims, see
infra notes 36-81 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (holding that marriage relationship
has constitutionally protected realm of sexual privacy because of unique and im-
portant aspects of marriage in society). Justice Douglas stated for the Court in
Griswold:
Marriage is the coming together for better or for worse, hopefully endur-
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths;
a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an associa-
tion for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id. at 486 (describing principles of marriage); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that state statute requiring sterilization of felons
unconstitutional because it interferes with fundamental rights to marry and pro-
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The question of spousal consortium claims within the Third Circuit is
further complicated by the fact that the Third Circuit has explicitly held a
parent can bring a claim for loss of consortium under Section 1983 in the
face of such anomalous results. 27 By granting a federal remedy for paren-
tal consortium claims before finding the same for spousal consortium
claims, and finding the parent-child relationship constitutionally pro-
tected but not the relationship between spouses, it seems that many
courts, including the Third Circuit, have forgotten that "first comes love,
then comes marriage, then comes baby .... -28 To put the spousal relation-
ship on equal legal footing with the parent-child relationship, the Third
Circuit should hold that claims for loss of spousal consortium can be
brought under Section 1983 by finding that spousal consortium is a consti-
tutionally protected right.29 Additionally, this result would resolve the cur-
rent district court split.3 0
create); Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205 (finding right to marry constitutionally protected
because it is most basic, foundational relationship of society).
27. See Estate of Bailey, 768 F.2d at 509 n.7 (holding that father could bring
claim for loss of consortium of his child under Section 1983 because he had cogni-
zable constitutional liberty interest in preserving life of his child). In Estate of Bai-
ley, a mother's boyfriend beat her child to death after the local child and youth
services agency failed to remove the child from the household despite reports of
child abuse. See id. at 507-08. The court set forth the contents of the complaint:
The complaint alleges that [plaintiffs child] died "as a result of said de-
fective institution's policies and procedures established, accepted and
employed by York County Children and Youth Services in investigating
the factors harming the child, in determining who was responsible for the
child's welfare, and/or in taking appropriate steps to remedy and correct
the child's environment so as to secure the child's welfare."
Id. (explaining complaint). In bringing a claim under Section 1983 for the loss of
consortium of his daughter, the plaintiff father asserted a deprivation of his consti-
tutional rights. See id. at 508 ("[Father] allege[s] that [his child] Aleta Bailey's
death from child abuse was the result of the actions of defendants who thereby
deprived... her father of [his] constitutional rights [under Section 1983]."). The
Third Circuit found the father's claim to be valid, holding that he suffered an
unconstitutional deprivation of "a right that logically extends from his recognized
liberty interest in the custody of his children and the maintenance and integrity of
the family." See id. at 509 n.7 (finding father's constitutional rights deprived by
state agency that had duty to him to protect his child's life).
28. See Miller, supra note 1 (listing popular children's nursery rhyme about
traditional family chronology) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the illogical
quality of this result, as well as the practical repercussions thereof, see infra notes
10946 and accompanying text.
29. See Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp., 227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 381 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(holding that spouse can assert loss of consortium claim under Section 1983). For
analysis of this approach to the constitutional protection of marriage, see infra
notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
30. Compare Norcross, 2006 WL 1995021, at *3 (holding no constitutional right
to spousal consortium, thus no standing for spouse to assert loss of consortium
claim under Section 1983), and Colburn v. City of Phila., No. CIV. A. 00-2781, 2001
WL 872960, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2001) (same); Wiers v. Barnes, 925 F. Supp.
1079, 1095-96 (D. Del. 1996) (same); Verde v. City of Phila., 862 F. Supp. 1329,
1337 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (same), with Pahle, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 381 (holding that rights
existing in Third Circuit between parents and children under decisions like Estate
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This Note argues that a spouse should be able to bring a claim for loss
of consortium under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for two reasons: first, because
spousal consortium is already a constitutionally protected right; and sec-
ond, because if it is not, spousal consortium, as the natural and logical
precursor to the parent-child relationship, should be protected as an as-
pect of the constitutionally protected parent-child relationship. 3 1 Part II
summarizes case law and supporting Supreme Court precedent in courts
that find no constitutionally protected right to spousal consortium, and
thus no basis for a loss of spousal consortium claim under Section 1983.32
Part III summarizes case law and supporting Supreme Court precedent in
those courts that do find a constitutionally protected right to spousal con-
sortium, and thus allow claims for loss of spousal consortium under Sec-
tion 1983. 3 3 Part IV examines the rise of the parental consortium claim as
an offspring of the traditional common law loss of spousal consortium
claim, and spousal consortium as a foundational basis for the constitution-
ally protected parent-child relationship. 34 Finally, Part V concludes with a
discussion of why the Third Circuit should find that claims for loss of
spousal consortium can be properly brought under Section 1983, in light
of both Supreme Court precedent supporting the marriage relationship
and policy considerations.
35
of Bailey logically extend to spouses, so spouse can assert loss of consortium claim
under Section 1983). For a discussion of the illogical results that arise from grant-
ing a federal remedy for loss of parental consortium claims without providing a
federal remedy for loss of spousal consortium claims, see infra notes 109-46 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the problems that result from a lack of a
federal remedy for loss of spousal consortium claims, including further detriment
to the spousal relationship, see infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
31. For a discussion of clear Supreme Court rulings that set out the constitu-
tional protection of the marriage relationship and demonstrate why parties should
be able to bring loss of spousal consortium claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see infra
notes 51-56, 85-93 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of the courts that do not allow plaintiffs to bring loss of
spousal consortium claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they do not find
spousal consortium to be an individual fundamental right protected by the Consti-
tution, see infra notes 36-81 and accompanying text.
33. For analyses of court opinions that do find loss of spousal consortium
claims can properly be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because spousal consor-
tium is an aspect of the constitutionally protected marriage relationship, see infra
notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
34. For a historical synopsis of loss of spousal consortium claims as the foun-
dation for loss of parental consortium claims, and thus the logical precursor to
such claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see infra notes 10946 and accompanying text.
35. Loss of spousal consortium claims are a practical necessity, and for argu-
ments as to the practical necessity of an available federal remedy under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for such claims, see infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
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II. No CONSTITUTIONAL CONSORTIUM: THE NARROW VIEW OF MARRIAGE
AS A SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Many district and circuit courts do not recognize spousal consortium
as a constitutionally protected right and find that a claim for loss of
spousal consortium cannot be brought under Section 1983.36 These
courts hold, as the primary logic of this position, that because spousal con-
sortium is not a right expressly "secured by the Constitution and laws," it is
not an injury for which Section 1983 provides a remedy.37 Such courts
rely heavily on Supreme Court precedent that has historically held that
only individuals who suffer an actual deprivation of their personal rights
can sue under Section 1983; therefore, no derivative claims or lawsuits can
be brought under the statute. 38 The foundation of this argument is that
any assertion for loss of spousal consortium under Section 1983 is a claim
36. See, e.g., Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding
that there is no constitutional right to spousal consortium because Supreme Court
has only ever recognized constitutional right to familial relations in parent-child
context); Stallworth v. City of Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830, 838 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding
that although Supreme Court has recognized constitutional protection for rights
to marry, to have children and to direct their education, Court has never sanc-
tioned constitutional protection for consortium); Norcross v. Town of Hammon-
ton, Civil No. 04-2536 (RBK), 2006 WL 1995021, at *3 (D.N.J. July 13, 2006)
(finding no constitutional right to spousal consortium exists, thus no standing for
spouse to assert loss of consortium claim under Section 1983); Colburn v. City of
Phila., No. CIV. A. 00-2781, 2001 WL 872960, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2001)
(same); Wiers v. Barnes, 925 F. Supp. 1079, 1095-96 (D. Del. 1996) (same); Verde
v. City of Phila., 862 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (same).
37. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976) (emphasizing that Section
1983 permits imposition of liability "only for conduct which 'subjects, or causes to
be subjected' the complainant to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws"); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 831 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding
that "a [Section] 1983 plaintiffs burden ... [is to] prove that the defendant
caused him to be subjected to a deprivation of constitutional rights"); O'Malley v.
Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 789 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that one may not recover dam-
ages under Section 1983 for violation of another's civil rights). Whether a spouse
can assert a claim for loss of consortium under Section 1983 necessarily turns on
whether a court finds spousal consortium to be constitutionally protected or not.
See, e.g., Harbuy, 233 F.3d at 605 (dismissing widow's claim for loss of consortium
under Section 1983 because there is no constitutional right to spousal consor-
tium); Stallworth, 893 F.2d at 838 (finding that spouse cannot assert claim for loss
of consortium because although Supreme Court has recognized constitutional
protection for rights to marry, to have children and to direct their education,
Court has never sanctioned constitutional protection for consortium).
38. See O'Malley, 477 F.2d at 785 (holding that one may not recover damages
under Section 1983 for violation of another's civil rights); see also Pahle v.
Colebrookdale Twp., 227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 381 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (citing McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)) (explaining that it has long been held that only
individuals who suffer actual deprivation of their personal rights can sue under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, so that no derivative claims or law suits can be brought under Sec-
tion 1983).
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derivative of the actual civil rights injury, because there is no right to
spousal consortium under the "Constitution and laws."
39
Therefore, these courts will not likely permit an individual to assert a
loss of spousal consortium claim under Section 1983 unless the Supreme
Court explicitly recognizes spousal consortium as a constitutionally pro-
tected right.40 Until that time, such courts maintain that spousal consor-
tium is not a right "secured by the Constitution and laws," such that if
deprived by government action, individuals have no constitutional re-
dress. 4 1 Thus, the language of Section 1983 provides no remedy for that
particular loss or injury, and the injured spouse is further precluded be-
cause no derivative claims are available under Section 1983.42
A. Norcross v. Town of Hammonton: The District of New Jersey's
Restrictive Approach to Loss of Spousal Consortium
Another argument for why loss of spousal consortium claims are not
permitted under Section 1983 is that the expansion of the rights and inter-
ests protected by substantive due process and the Constitution warrants
extreme caution. 43 The United States District Court for the District of
39. See Harbuty, 233 F.3d at 605 (holding that Supreme Court has only ever
recognized constitutional right to familial relations in parent-child context); Stall-
worth, 893 F.2d at 838 (holding that Supreme Court has never sanctioned constitu-
tional protection of consortium).
40. See Harbury, 233 F.3d at 605 (holding no constitutional right to consor-
tium in spousal context because it would be too great expansion of existing sub-
stantive constitutional rights); Norcross, 2006 WL 1995021, at *2 ("While the
Supreme Court has recognized constitutional protection for 'rights to marry, to
have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital
privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion,' the Court has
never sanctioned constitutional protection of consortium.").
41. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2007) (describing rights protected by federal
law).
42. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-71 (emphasizing that Section 1983 permits impo-
sition of liability "only for conduct which 'subjects, or causes to be subjected' the
complainant to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws");
O'Malley, 477 F.2d at 789 (holding that one may not recover damages under Sec-
tion 1983 for violation of another's civil rights); see also Pahle, 227 F. Supp. 2d at
381 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)) (finding that only individ-
uals who suffer actual deprivation of their personal rights can sue under Section
1983).
43. See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (declining to ex-
pand substantive constitutional rights to include right to safe working environ-
ment); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985) (holding
that student's dismissal from academic program did not amount to constitutional
violation because no constitutional right in one's personal academic investment
exists). In describing why it is so important to exercise caution when in the realm
of substantive expansion of constitutional rights, the Collins Court stated:
As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.
The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost
care whenever [the Court is] asked to break new ground in this field.
[Vol. 52: p. 569
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New Jersey, for example, felt it reached the correct conclusion in Norcross
v. Town of Hammonton4 4 when it held that "[w]hile the Supreme Court has
recognized constitutional protection for 'rights to marry, to have children,
to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital pri-
vacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion,' the Court
has never sanctioned constitutional protection of consortium." 45 In Nor-
cross, Geraldine Singletary sued the town of Hammonton, New Jersey for
the use of excessive force against her in the course of an arrest under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 4 6 Her husband, Robert Singletary, brought a claim for loss
of consortium under the same statute. 4 7
The court granted partial summary judgment for the town of Ham-
monton on Robert Singletary's claim on the grounds that his claim was
not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.48 The court's reasoning provided
an extremely nuanced view of substantive constitutional rights, stating that
"constitutional protection of privacy is not equivalent to constitutional
protection of the relationship; nor is consortium equivalent to mar-
riage."49 Unfortunately, this line of reasoning is extremely narrow and
Collins, 503 U.S. at 125 (citations omitted).
44. Civil No. 04-2536 (RBK), 2006 WL 1995021 (D.N.J. July 13, 2006).
45. Id. at *2 (holding that no constitutional right to spousal consortium exists
under substantive due process doctrine as it has been set forth by Supreme Court).
46. See id. at *1 (discussing plaintiff's claims arising from arrest by local law
enforcement, alleging "excessive force in addition to various common law torts").
47. See id. ("Plaintiff Robert Singletary... alleges loss of consortium resulting
from the events surrounding the arrest of his wife [under 42 U.S.C. § 1983].").
48. See id. at *3 (granting partial summary judgment to defendants on
grounds that no constitutional right to spousal consortium exists). In the alterna-
tive, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey also granted
partial summary judgment to the town of Hammonton based on the fact that
plaintiff Robert Singletary could not show that the actions of the arresting officers
were specifically intended to harm his spousal relationship with his wife. See id. at
*2 n.4 ("[I]n the alternative [Hammonton is] entitled to partial judgment because
[officer's] actions in arresting Geraldine Singletary were not directed toward the
spousal relationship between Plaintiff Robert Singletary and his arrested wife.").
For a further discussion and analysis of this heightened evidentiary standard and
the courts that implement it, see infta notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
49. See id. at *3 (explaining reasoning for why loss of spousal consortium
claims cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including supposed absence of
Supreme Court precedent finding spousal consortium constitutionally protected).
The Norcross court criticized the Pahle court for relying on Supreme Court prece-
dent protecting privacy in the marital relationship and concluded that "marital
integrity and spousal association implicate constitutional due process rights." See
id. (citations omitted) (noting that privacy in marriage relationship is not identical
to consortium, thus constitutional protection of marriage does not necessarily flow
directly to spousal consortium); see also Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526, 533 (7th
Cir. 1992) (noting that "consortium is not a synonym for marriage. It is the name
of the sexual and other services... that spouses render to each other" and "[t] he
right to a husband's assistance in raking leaves is not a liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment").
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does not give deference to the full scope of rights the Supreme Court has
already found to be well-protected by the Constitution.
50
B. The Long Wait for Supreme Court Protection of "Spousal Consortium"
Historically, the Supreme Court has unambiguously established that
the rights to marry and to have privacy in the marital relationship are con-
stitutionally protected.5 1 It is therefore redundant for lower courts to
hold that it is necessary for the Court to explicitly state that spousal con-
sortium is protected by the Constitution.5 2 When the Supreme Court pro-
tected marriage and privacy within marriage, it protected all aspects of
50. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("[T]his Court's histori-
cal recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a funda-
mental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.") (summarizing
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("Our decisions establish that the Constitution pro-
tects the sanctity of the family."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965) (holding that marriage relationship has constitutionally protected realm of
sexual privacy because of importance of marriage in society in addition to unique
association between spouses); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) ("The
home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that
life is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection
the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right."); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (recognizing history of Supreme Court
decisions that have respected fairly larger private realm of family life that state
cannot enter); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding that Four-
teenth Amendment protects "freedom to marry, establish a home and bring up
children"); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888) (describing marriage as
"the most important relation in life" and "the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress").
51. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (holding that marriage relationship is in-
cluded in constitutionally protected realm of sexual privacy); Maynard, 125 U.S. at
205 (finding the right to marry constitutionally protected); see also Perry, supra
note 8, at 32 (discussing realm of sexual privacy that protects marriage
relationship).
52. See Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp., 227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 381-82 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (holding that right to assert loss of parental consortium under Section 1983
"logically extend[s] to spouses"). The Pahle court gave Supreme Court holdings
regarding constitutional marriage the logical scope they deserve. See id. at 382
("[W]e believe the Supreme Court's language concerning the institution is equally
apt when applied to the Due Process rights implicated here: marital integrity and
spousal association."). For a discussion of this opinion and its analysis of loss of
spousal consortium claims under Section 1983, see infra notes 94-105 and accom-
panying text.
Additionally, several historic Supreme Court holdings protecting marriage im-
plicate, if not explicitly mention, aspects of the marriage relationship such as sex-
ual relations and companionship that are the integral elements of spousal
consortium. See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S. at 167 (recognizing history of Supreme Court
decisions that have respected significant private realm of family life which state
cannot enter); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that state
statute requiring sterilization of felons unconstitutional because it interferes with
individual fundamental rights to marry and procreate).
582
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marriage, especially those that are most private between spouses. 5 3 Con-
sortium is material to privacy within the marital relationship. 54 Courts
that require the Supreme Court to state that spousal consortium is pro-
tected by the Constitution ask the Court to repeat a clear and historic
holding.55 Finding constitutional protection through due process for
spousal consortium does not expand the realm of substantive constitu-
tional rights; it is merely one aspect of a right long recognized.
56
53. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (noting "this Court's historical recognition
that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment") (summarizing Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (holding that sexual
privacy of marriage relationship is constitutionally protected due to sanctity and
importance of marriage relationship); Poe, 367 U.S. at 551-52 ("The home derives
its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is some-
thing so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the princi-
ples of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right."); Prince, 321 U.S. at
167 (recognizing history of Supreme Court decisions that have respected aspects
of private realm of family life that state cannot enter); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (find-
ing that Fourteenth Amendment protects "freedom to marry, establish a home and
bring up children"). Despite the clear Supreme Court precedent protecting the
marriage relationship, it is undeniable that the broad language the Court has used
has been problematic for spouses attempting to assert a loss of consortium claim
under Section 1983. It is difficult to assert this right because of the explicit lan-
guage courts look for when considering what rights are specifically protected by
the Constitution and what rights are not. See, e.g., Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d
596, 607 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that widow's Section 1983 claim for loss of
spousal consortium failed because her claim lacked "foundation in constitutional
jurisprudence" where she relied upon broad constitutional language in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), which asserted that there is "private
realm of family life" protected by Fourteenth Amendment).
54. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (holding that marriage relationship is sur-
rounded by constitutionally protected realm of sexual privacy because of impor-
tant role of marriage in society); Prince, 321 U.S. at 167 (recognizing history of
Supreme Court decisions that have respected private realm of family life that state
cannot enter because of important place family relationships occupy in society); see
also Perry, supra note 8, at 32 (discussing realm of sexual privacy protecting mar-
riage relationship).
55. See Harbury, 233 F.3d at 605-06 (holding that there is no constitutional
right to spousal consortium because Supreme Court has only recognized constitu-
tional right to familial relations in parent-child context); Stallworth v. City of
Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830, 838 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that although Supreme
Court has recognized constitutional protection for rights to marry, to have chil-
dren and to direct their education, Court has never expressly sanctioned constitu-
tional protection for spousal consortium, thus such constitutional protection does
not exist); Norcross v. Town of Hammonton, Civil No. 04-2536 (RBK), 2006 WL
1995021, at *3 (D.N.J. July 13, 2006) (finding no constitutional right to spousal
consortium, thus no standing for spouse to assert loss of consortium claim under
Section 1983); Colburn v. City of Phila., No. CIV. A. 00-2781, 2001 WL 872960, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2001) (same); Wiers v. Barnes, 925 F. Supp. 1079, 1095-96 (D.
Del. 1996) (same); Verde v. City of Phila., 862 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(same).
56. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (protecting marriage relationship and com-
munications between spouses with realm of sexual privacy). While there is no
completely agreed upon definition of "spousal consortium," it is widely thought to
include the comfort, companionship and conjugal society of a spouse to the other.
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A second argument prevalent in court opinions that do not find
spousal consortium to be constitutionally protected is that because the Su-
preme Court has only ever recognized a constitutional right to familial
relations in the parent-child context, it simply does not exist in the spousal
context.57 For example, in Harbury v. Deutch,58 plaintiffJennifer Harbury,
a widow, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Central
Intelligence Agency for the wrongful death and loss of consortium of her
husband.59 Harbury argued that loss of consortium claims under Section
1983 logically extend from the parent-child context, to encompass the
spousal context as well.
60
See Parker, supra note 16, at 41-42 (defining spousal consortium and explaining
that interference with spouse's right to consortium violates not only natural right
but also spouse's legal right arising out of marriage relationship).
57. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758, 768-70 (holding that prosecution must
make higher evidentiary showing of child neglect to terminate parental rights be-
cause they are protected by Constitution); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (finding that unwed fathers have constitutional right to custody of their
children upon mother's death). One major way the Supreme Court has found the
Constitution protects familial relationships from undue government interference
is by holding that parents have a constitutional right to maintain their relationship
with their children. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 (holding that parent has constitu-
tional right to custody of children until state can affirmatively prove parent is un-
fit); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (finding that father has constitutional right to custody
of children upon mother's death because of importance of parent-child relation-
ship). The Supreme Court has also protected parental rights by affording parents
primary control over the raising of their children. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 ("It is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder."); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that parents have constitutional right to give
their children religious training and encourage them to practice it); Pierce v. Soc'y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925) (finding that state requirement compelling
children to attend public school unconstitutional because parents have constitu-
tional right to choose their children's schooling under Fourteenth Amendment);
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390 (holding that parents have constitutional right to raise their
children without government interference, including language child speaks).
58. 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
59. See id. at 598 (discussing plaintiffs claims under Section 1983 against gov-
ernment agencies for alleged involvement in torture and death of her husband).
Harbury claimed that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials took part in the
torture and murder of her husband, a Guatemalan citizen. See id. (reciting facts of
plaintiffs claims, particularly that plaintiffs husband was captured, detained and
abused by CIA-supported Guatemalan Security Forces). In seeking damages,
Harbury filed in federal court and claimed violation of her right to familial associa-
tion. See id. (detailing most pertinent of plaintiffs twenty-eight specific causes of
action against CIA defendants).
60. See id. at 604-05 (alleging unconstitutional deprivation of right to continu-
ing association with husband). Harbury argued that the holdings of cases such as
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), that pro-
tected intimate personal choices within a realm of privacy, should consequently
protect the personal and familial private decisions made as part of the consortium
in her marriage. See Harbury, 233 F.3d at 607 (citing broad Supreme Court protec-
tions of privacy, personal choices, as well as liberty under Fourteenth
Amendment).
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In declining to grant such an extension, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit relied heavily on an exacting
view of Supreme Court precedent. 6 1 The District of Columbia Circuit
found that the Supreme Court has only explicitly held that the Constitu-
tion protects the substantive right parents have to maintain their relation-
ship with their children, and has never stated that the Constitution
protects an analogous right in spouses to maintain their relationship with
their husband or wife. 62 Therefore, the circuit court reasoned, only pa-
rental consortium is a constitutional right; spousal consortium is not.
63
This approach, similar to the approach by the District Court of New
Jersey, excessively limits existing constitutionally protected rights.6 4 By
giving prior Supreme Court holdings a narrow reading, these courts do
not give established rights their fair weight and deference, and they ask
61. See Harbury, 233 F.3d at 606 (citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115, 125 (1992)) (reiterating warning from Collins that judicial restraint must be
exercised when considering expanding liberty interests protected by substantive
due process).
62. See id. (declining to expand substantive due process to encompass loss of
spousal consortium). The court expressly noted that "the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized a right to continuing familial association only in cases involving parent-
child relationships. In doing so, the Court has emphasized the importance of the
parent-child bond." Id. (finding that individual's liberty interest in relationships
with others does not extend beyond parent-child context, even to other closely
held familial relations).
63. See id. at 606-07 (dismissing widow's loss of consortium claim under Sec-
tion 1983 for lack of foundation in constitutionaljurisprudence). In reaching its
conclusion, the Harbuiy court relied heavily on the First Circuit opinion in Ortiz v.
Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1986). See Harbury, 233 F.3d at 606 ("The First Cir-
cuit, declining to extend due process protection to incidental deprivations of fa-
milial association, used language we think particularly compelling."). In Oriz, the
First Circuit stated:
[We] seek neither to minimize the loss of a family member nor to deni-
grate the fundamental liberty interest in matters of family life that has
long been a part of our constitutional fabric.... But even an interest of
great importance may not always be entitled to constitutional protection.
Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 10 (explaining rationale for not recognizing claim for loss of
spousal consortium).
64. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (holding decision to procreate
as constitutionally private to woman herself, or as between spouses); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (holding that marriage relationship and
spousal communications have constitutionally protected realm of sexual privacy
because of their importance to society); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167
(1944) (recognizing history of Supreme Court decisions that have respected as-
pects of private realm of family life that state cannot enter); Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (finding right to marry constitutionally protected because,
among other things, "[marriage is] the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress"). Not all district
courts within the Third Circuit limit the constitutional protection of marriage in
this way. See Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp., 227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 381 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (holding that rights existing between parents and children "logically ex-
tend [ ]" to spouses, thus spouse can assert loss of consortium claim under Section
1983). For a further discussion of courts that do not limit the constitutional pro-
tections of marriage, see infra notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
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the Court to repeat what it has already stated.65 While it may be true that
the context in which the Supreme Court has held that familial relations
were constitutionally protected was that of the parent-child relationship, it
does not alter the fact that "familial relations" logically and plainly include
the relationships between spouses in addition to those between parents
and children,just as "marital privacy" logically and plainly includes spousal
consortium. 66 Therefore, courts that hold spousal consortium is not con-
stitutionally protected ignore the Supreme Court's recognition of the ne-
cessity for prudent expansion of substantive rights. 6 7  They instead
constrict established rights by failing to recognize them within their logical
scope.
68
65. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (holding decision to have or not have children
constitutionally private to woman herself, or to woman and spouse); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 479 (holding that constitutionally private decision to use contraception is
part of realm of sexual privacy).
66. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (noting "this
Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family
life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment")
(summarizing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("Our decisions establish that the Constitu-
tion protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the fam-
ily is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and
cultural."); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 496 (emphasizing that "the traditional relation of
the family [is] a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization"); Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("The home derives
its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is some-
thing so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the princi-
ples of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right."); Prince, 321 U.S. at
167 (recognizing history of Supreme Court decisions that have respected private
realm of family life that state cannot enter); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (finding that Fourteenth Amendment protects "freedom to marry, estab-
lish a home and bring up children"); see also Perry, supra note 8, at 32 (discussing
realm of sexual privacy that protects marriage relationship). Even if the only con-
stitutionally protected aspects of marriage are the decision to marry and to make
private family decisions, spousal division of labor and deciding whether to have
children also may be severely impacted and restricted as elements of a loss of con-
sortium claim because loss of consortium includes economic elements, socioemo-
tional elements and sexual elements. See Parker, supra note 16, at 41-42 (defining
spousal consortium to include spousal comfort, companionship and conjugal
society).
67. See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (declining to ex-
pand substantive constitutional rights to afford individual constitutional right to
safe working environment because "[t] he doctrine ofjudicial self-restraint requires
us to exercise the utmost care").
68. Compare Harbury, 233 F.3d at 604 (refusing to extend constitutional right
of familial association to case in which government indirectly interfered with
spousal relationship by allegedly murdering woman's husband), and Norcross v.
Town of Hammonton, Civil No. 04-2536 (RBK), 2006 WL 1995021, at *3 (D.N.J.
July 13, 2006) ("While the Supreme Court has recognized constitutional protec-
tion for 'rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing
of one's children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and
to abortion,' the Court has never sanctioned constitutional protection of consor-
tium."), with Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04 ("Our decisions establish that the Constitu-
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C. The "Creative Requirements" Approach to Loss of Spousal Consortium
Finally, several courts restrict individuals' ability to bring loss of
spousal consortium claims under Section 1983 by placing unwarranted
burdensome requirements on these claims. 69 Although these courts do
not explicitly deny the possibility of a loss of spousal consortium claim
under Section 1983, they greatly limit the probability of their success be-
cause plaintiffs must make a very high evidentiary showing to even get past
summary judgment.70 Specifically, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the First and Fourth Circuits have held that although the right to private
familial relationships is protected by the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff
must show direct, intentional interference with the relationship for a con-
stitutional violation to exist.
71
tion protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural."); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 496 (emphasizing that "the traditional rela-
tion of the family [is] a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civiliza-
tion"); Poe, 367 U.S. at 551-52 (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("The home derives its pre-
eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is something so
fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of more
than one explicitly granted Constitutional right."); Prince, 321 U.S. at 167 (recog-
nizing history of Supreme Court decisions that have respected aspects of private
realm of family life which state cannot enter).
69. See, e.g., Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 804-05 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
mother's claim for loss of consortium of son who was killed by state trooper was
not cognizable because "the Supreme Court has never extended the constitution-
ally protected liberty interest incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to encompass deprivations resulting from governmental actions af-
fecting the family only incidentally"); Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1986)
(holding that right to familial relationships free from undue government interfer-
ence is protected by Constitution, but that plaintiff must show direct, intentional
interference with relationship in order to find due process violation).
70. See, e.g., Shaw, 13 F.3d at 804-05 (holding that district court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' substantive due
process claim); Harpole v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 927-28 (8th
Cir. 1987) (dismissing grandmother's claim for loss of grandson's consortium for
failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted); Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 7 (dis-
missing plaintiff's loss of consortium claim under Section 1983 on summary
judgment).
71. See, e.g., Shaw, 13 F.3d at 804-05 (holding that mother's loss of consortium
claim under Section 1983 had no cause of action because Supreme Court has
never extended constitutional protection of family relationships to encompass
deprivations resulting from governmental actions only incidentally affecting fam-
ily); Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8 (holding stepfather's claim for loss of stepson's consortium
under Section 1983 had no cause of action because beating was not specifically
intended to deprive stepfather of association with stepson).
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The First Circuit's use of this high standard has greatly limited loss of
consortium claims in that jurisdiction. 72 For example, in Ortiz v. Burgos,73
a stepfather, mother and siblings sued prison authorities under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for the loss of consortium of their son and brother when he was
beaten to death by prison guards.7 4 In holding that the stepfather and
siblings did not have a constitutionally protected interest in the compan-
ionship of the deceased, the First Circuit declined "to make the leap our-
selves from the realm of governmental action directly aimed at the
relationship between a parent and a young child to an incidental depriva-
tion of the relationship between appellants and their adult relative." 75
The First Circuit, thus, created a higher standard for Section 1983 loss of
consortium claims than the Supreme Court has ever called for, requiring
parties to show a direct, intentional interference with the relationship at
issue. 76
Placing this high burden on plaintiffs is unwarranted and contrary to
the plain language of the Supreme Court's repeated holdings that familial
relationships are constitutionally protected. 77 The Court has always held
that these relationships should be and are protected from governmental
72. See, e.g., Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1061 (1st Cir. 1997) (dismissing loss
of consortium under Section 1983 for failure to show intentional deprivation of
the familial relationship); Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556,
563 (1st Cir. 1988) (same); Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8 (same).
73. 807 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986).
74. See id. at 7 (discussing plaintiffs' claims).
75. Id. at 9 (drawing distinction between substantive due process cases involv-
ing parent-child relationship and other familial relationships).
76. See id. (discussing heightened evidentiary requirement placed on plaintiffs
to make valid constitutional argument for loss of consortium claims brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983). The Supreme Court has never expressly required a plaintiff
bringing a claim for constitutional violations of the family relationship to show
intentional interference with the relationship. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("Our decisions establish that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that
we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and
cultural.").
77. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (noting "this
Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family
life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment")
(summarizing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)); Moore, 431 U.S. at
503-04 (recognizing constitutional protection of family exists because institution of
family is integral to society); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965)
(emphasizing that "the traditional relation of the family [is] a relation as old and
as fundamental as our entire civilization"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of
family life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has
been found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly
granted Constitutional right."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944)
(recognizing history of Supreme Court decisions that have respected aspects of
private realm of family life which state cannot enter); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (finding that Fourteenth Amendment protects "freedom to marry,
establish a home and bring up children").
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interference, and has never required a showing of intentional interfer-
ence. 78 While the Court may have found undue interference with pro-
tected familial relationships where that interference was, in fact,
intentional or direct, the Court has never expressly placed such a high
evidentiary burden on a plaintiff asserting infringement of a constitutional
right.79 It is wrong for lower courts to create such a standard.8 0 This ap-
78. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748 (requiring high burden on states to show
justification for terminating parental rights by clear and convincing evidence);
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 39 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that "although the Constitution is verbally silent on the specific subject of
families, freedom of personal choice in matters of family life long has been viewed
as a fundamental liberty interest worthy of protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment" so state must make high evidentiary showing before validly infring-
ing on such rights); Moore, 431 U.S. at 501-02 (finding that basic reasons constitu-
tional rights are associated with family guarantees family relationships to be free of
arbitrary state interference regardless of state intent); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484
(stating that Constitution protects "against all government invasions 'of the sanc-
tity of a man's home and the privacies of life"') (emphasis added); Poe, 367 U.S. at
551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding that more than one explicit constitutional
right protects family life from undue state interference regardless if interference is
intentional or not); Prince, 321 U.S. at 167 (recognizing history of Supreme Court
decisions that have respected private realm of family life which state cannot enter
but failing to mention requirement of intentional interference by state); Meyer, 262
U.S. at 399 (finding that Fourteenth Amendment protects not only freedom from
bodily harm, but also "freedom to marry, establish a home and bring up children"
without undue interference, regardless of state intention).
79. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 502 (finding that right to private family rela-
tionships is free from all substantial arbitrary impositions); Griswold, 381 U.S. at
485 (stating that right to privacy is essence of constitutional liberty so that sanctity
of private home life is protected against all government invasions); Pierce v. Soc'y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that state requirement of public
education directly interferes with parents' constitutional right to control upbring-
ing of their children). Conversely, in fact, the Supreme Court has frequently
placed a high burden on the state to show valid action infringing upon the consti-
tutionally-protected family rights. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748 (holding that
state action to terminate constitutionally protected parental rights requires clear
and convincing evidentiary showing); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 38-39 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (finding that termination of parental rights directly interferes with consti-
tutionally protected parent-child relationship, thus state must make high
evidentiary showing for action to be valid); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1981) (holding that state fee for paternity test intrudes upon constitutionally pro-
tected parental rights); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972) (holding
parents' constitutional interests in children's education are more protected than
state's interest, even when children themselves support state's interest); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (declaring Illinois statute presuming unfitness of
unwed fathers "constitutionally repugnant" for violation of protected parental
rights).
80. See, e.g., Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 804-05 (4th Cir. 1994) (declining to
extend substantive constitutional rights to situations where no direct interference
by government takes place); Harpole v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923,
927-28 (8th Cir. 1987) (same); Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1986)
(finding no independent cause of action for loss of familial association to exist
where injury was not specifically intended to deprive stepfather of his association
with stepson); Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Santa Fe, 768
F.2d 1186, 1188-90 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding that siblings have actionable claim
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proach goes beyond "prudent expansion" of substantive rights to an un-
warranted restricting of plaintiffs' ability to protect their own
constitutional rights through legal redress.81
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF SPOUSAL CONSORTIUM: THE
LOGICAL READING OF MARRIAGE AS A SUBSTANTIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
Courts on the other side of this debate also rely upon Supreme Court
precedent to support their position that a constitutional right to spousal
consortium exists.8 2 These courts do not expand the existing realm of
substantive constitutional rights, but instead follow the existing precedent
that has historically protected the marriage relationship to its logical con-
clusion.8 3 This reading finds that spousal consortium is an integral aspect
of marriage, and therefore it is protected by the same constitutional provi-
sions and Supreme Court rulings that protect the marriage institution and
relationship in general.
84
A. Constitutional Precedent Protecting the Marriage Relationship
Explicit Supreme Court support and protection of the marriage rela-
tionship dates back to 1888, when the Supreme Court noted in Maynard v.
Hilla5 that "marriage is the most important relation in life" and that it is
under Section 1983 for loss of family member, but only if they allege intentional
deprivation of rights).
81. See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (warning that ex-
pansion of substantive due process rights requires judicial self-restraint).
82. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (holding that private decisions by married
couples, such as whether to use contraception, are protected by realm of sexual
privacy in which government should not interfere); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,
205, 211 (1888) (describing marriage as "the most important relation in life" and
"the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress").
83. See Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp., 227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 381-82 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (holding that same rights existing in Third Circuit between parents and
children logically extend to spouses, thus spouse can assert loss of consortium
claim under Section 1983). The Pahle court recognized the long history of Su-
preme Court precedent protecting the institution of marriage generally. See id. at
382; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding decision to procreate
as constitutionally private to woman or as between spouses); Griswold, 381 U.S. at
486 (holding that marriage relationship needs constitutionally protected realm of
sexual privacy); Prince, 321 U.S. at 167 (recognizing history of Supreme Court deci-
sions that have respected private realm of family life, including spousal relation-
ship, which state cannot enter); Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205, 211 (finding right to
marry constitutionally protected because, among other things, "marriage is the
most important relation in life" and "[marriage is] the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress").
84. See Pahle, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 381 (finding that "Third Circuit precedent
suggests that a husband or wife should be able to claim violations of his or her own
constitutional rights under § 1983 for unlawfully, government-imposed injuries to
a spouse that have a devastating impact on their marriage").
85. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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"the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress. '8 6 Later, in 1965, the Court held in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut8 7 that a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contra-
ceptives was unconstitutional because it intruded upon the constitutional
realm of privacy that protects the marriage relationship.8 8 In so holding,
the Griswold Court found the privacy of marriage to be just as important as
the marriage relationship itself.8 9 As Justice Douglas stated,
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.9 0
Griswold ultimately established that a realm of sexual privacy protects
the marriage relationship.9 1 While consortium includes other relation-
ship aspects in addition to sexual relations, such as companionship, soci-
ety, assistance, support and friendship, the sexual aspect of marriage is
undoubtedly substantial.9 2 While Section 1983 does not allow for deriva-
tive claims, that point has no consequence in this context; a spouse's inde-
pendent and personal constitutional rights are infringed upon when the
86. Id. at 205, 211 (discussing legal and social importance of marriage
relationship).
87. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88. See id. at 485-86 (discussing reasoning behind protected realm of privacy
surrounding marriage relationship).
89. See id. at 486 (discussing holding of case).
90. Id. at 486. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court's view of marriage
helps the valid state objective of promoting stable families, see infra notes 127-35
and accompanying text.
91. See id. at 485-86 ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts
of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."). Ulti-
mately, the Griswold Court found that the right of spouses to privately choose for
themselves to use contraception was a penumbral right of privacy created by sev-
eral overlapping fundamental constitutional rights. See id. at 485 ("The present
case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by sev-
eral fundamental constitutional guarantees.").
92. See Parker, supra note 16, at 40-42 (defining spousal consortium and ex-
plaining that interference with spouse's right to consortium violates not only natu-
ral right but also spouse's legal right arising out of marriage relationship). Indeed,
the substantial sexual aspect of a loss of spousal consortium claim speaks to the
historic common law view of procreation as the primary purpose of marriage. See
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (stating that "[t]he institution
of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and
rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis"); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (finding that "our society as a
whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and
the rearing of children"). For a further discussion of the interplay between the
sexual aspect of a loss of spousal consortium claim and the traditional views of the
purposes of marriage, see infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
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other spouse's injuries have a devastating impact on the marriage and pri-
vate aspects of the marriage relationship.
93
B. Pahle v. Colebrookdale Township: The Eastern District of
Pennsylvania's "Common Sense" Approach to Loss of
Spousal Consortium
Courts that find a constitutional right to spousal consortium have also
found that legislative history and the spirit of Section 1983 permit loss of
spousal consortium claims under that provision. 94 In Pahle v. Colebrookdale
Township,95 for example, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania found that a spouse had the right to assert her loss
of consortium claim under Section 1983.96 In reaching such a conclusion,
the court relied on the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 9 7 which provided the
legislative foundation for 42 U.S.C. § 1983.98 In Pahle, plaintiff Ted Pahle
was severely injured and became permanently disabled as the result of im-
proper officer conduct in the course of a drunk driving arrest.9 9 Pahle
sued the township's police department under Section 1983.100 His wife,
Lynn Pahle, also sued under Section 1983 for loss of spousal consortium
and direct interference with her constitutional rights of marital integrity
and spousal association. 10 1
The court held that Lynn Pahle's claim was properly brought under
Section 1983, and found that "a spouse may assert a claim under 1983 that
the government improperly interfered with her personal right to the ser-
vices, society and companionship of her husband (i.e., consortium), deny-
ing her Due Process of law, to which she is entitled under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 10 2 In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized the
93. See Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp., 227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 381 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(likening claim of spouse for deprivation of consortium without due process of law
to claim of parent for deprivation of consortium of their child without due process
of law, which is valid claim in Third Circuit).
94. See Dist. of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423-25 (1973) (holding that
analysis of purposes of Section 1983 must "take cognizance of the events and pas-
sions of the time at which it was enacted.... [Section] 1983 has its roots in [Sec-
tion] 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Act of Apr. 20, 1871"); Pahle, 227 F. Supp.
2d at 382 (finding that legislative history of Section 1983 in Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871 supports compensating wife for loss of husband's consortium).
95. 227 F. Supp. 2d 361 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
96. See id. at 382 (discussing holding of case).
97. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (prohibiting state
interference with civil rights and private action denying equal protection).
98. See Pahle, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 382-83 (citing Seventh Circuit's analysis of
legislative history of Section 1983 where Seventh Circuit found right for spouse to
assert loss of consortium claims under Section 1983); see also Carter, 409 U.S. at 423
(discussing roots of Section 1983 in Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871).
99. See Pahle, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 365-66 (discussing facts of case).
100. See id. at 364 (discussing husband's claim in case).
101. See id. (discussing wife's claim in case).
102. Id. at 380 (finding that plaintiff brought valid loss of spousal consortium
claim under Section 1983).
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legislative history of Section 1983 as specifically found in the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871.103 The Act was read as intending "in part, to compensate a
wife for what she lost-that is, a vindication of her own rights-when her
husband was injured through unlawful government action."1 0 4 The Act's
own legislative history states:
This is what we offer to the people of the United States as a rem-
edy for wrongs, arsons and murders done. This is what we offer
to a man whose house has been burned, as a remedy; to a woman
whose husband has been murdered, as a remedy; to the children whose
father has been killed, as a remedy. 105
C. The History and Spirit of Section 1983 as Protecting Spousal Consortium
The Ku Klux Klan Act shows that the right to be peaceful in one's
closely held personal relationships, both as between spouses and between
parents and children, is of the utmost importance in United States his-
tory. 10 6 Therefore, when translated into rights actionable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, just as the right to be secure in one's own person and the right to
have and raise children are actionable civil rights claims if violated, the
right to have and enjoy a relationship with one's spouse is actionable as
well. 10 7 Courts that use this interpretation of Section 1983 give a more
logical reading to the statute and give full credit to the history, spirit and
specific Supreme Court case law enumerating substantive rights protected
by the Constitution. 10 8
103. See id. at 382 (discussing legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
104. Id. (holding Ku Klux Klan Act to be relevant to loss of spousal consor-
tium claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
105. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 807 (1871) (emphasis added); see also
Pahle, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (interpreting legislative history of Ku Klux Klan Act).
106. See Pahle, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 382-83 (reasoning that spirit of Ku Klux Klan
Act supports finding right to spousal consortium).
107. See id. (interpreting legislative history of Ku Klux Klan Act as reason to
allow plaintiffs to bring loss of spousal consortium claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
108. See, e.g., Flores v. Cameron County, 92 F.3d 258, 271 (5th Cir. 1996)
(finding loss of consortium available under Section 1983 when spouse, parent or
child suffers actionable physical injury in cases in which Texas state law governs);
Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1991) (child can recover, as of
date of his birth, under Section 1983 for unwarranted interference with his rights
to familial consortium after unlawful shooting of father by police); Bell v. City of
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1223 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding spouse has right to assert
loss of consortium claim under Section 1983), overruled by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d
783 (7th Cir. 2005) (overruling Bell "insofar as it recognized a constitutional fight
to recover for the loss of companionship of an adult child when that relationship is
terminated as an incidental result of state action"); Pahle, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 383
(holding that wife can assert claim for loss of husband's consortium under Section
1983); Robinson v. Johnson, 975 F. Supp. 950, 955 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding loss
of consortium available under Section 1983 when spouse, parent or child suffers
actionable physical injury). But see Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 604-06 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (refusing to extend constitutional right of familial association to case in
which government indirectly interfered with spousal relationship by allegedly mur-
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IV. FIRST COMES... BABY?
The second argument for finding loss of spousal consortium claims to
be properly brought under Section 1983 is one of logic.' 0 9 Without a
right to bring spousal consortium claims under Section 1983, an illogical
outcome results; parents can bring a loss of consortium claim under Sec-
tion 1983 for their children, yet spouses cannot bring consortium claims
for their husbands or wives under the same statute.1 10 The discord of this
result is especially apparent upon examination of the origin of loss of pa-
rental consortium claims. 1 '
A. Parental Consortium: "Offspring" of Spousal Consortium
While not all jurisdictions currently recognize the right of a parent or
child to sue for loss of consortium, the number ofjurisdictions that do has
steadily increased since Wisconsin first recognized this right in Shockley v.
dering woman's husband, noting that Bailey and Bell decisions tend to disagree);
Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Santa Fe, 768 F.2d 1186, 1190
(10th Cir. 1985) (disagreeing with Bell, holding that allegation of intent to inter-
fere with particular relationship protected by freedom of association is required to
state claim under Section 1983); Helleloid v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 361, 149 F.
Supp. 2d 863, 877 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding that parents of child suing school
district for sexual abuse of their child could not recover under Section 1983 be-
cause they were not target of district's actions); Winton v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Tulsa
County, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1254 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (finding no constitutional
right to spousal consortium, therefore spouse not entitled to Section 1983 claim
for loss of husband's consortium); Walters v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, 548 F. Supp. 417,
419 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (concluding that loss of consortium does not rise to constitu-
tional level). For a further discussion of the rationale of courts that do not find a
right for a spouse to assert a loss of consortium claim under Section 1983, see supra
notes 36-81 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of the Supreme Court authority protecting familial rela-
tionships and marriage in general, see supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Harbury, 233 F.3d at 605-06 (holding that there is no constitu-
tional right to spousal consortium, but there is constitutional right to parental con-
sortium); Stallworth v. City of Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830, 838 (6th Cir. 1990)
(finding that although Supreme Court has recognized constitutional protection
for rights to marry, to have children and to direct their education and upbringing,
Court has never sanctioned constitutional protection of consortium); Norcross v.
Town of Hammonton, Civil No. 04-2536 (RBK), 2006 WL 1995021, at *3 (D.N.J.
July 13, 2006) (finding no constitutional right to spousal consortium despite Third
Circuit holding that constitutional right to parental consortium exists); Colburn v.
City of Phila., No. CIV. A. 00-2781, 2001 WL 872960, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2001)
(same); Wiers v. Barnes, 925 F. Supp. 1079, 1095-96 (D. Del. 1996) (same); Verde
v. City of Phila., 862 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (same).
111. See Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495, 497-99 (Wis. 1975) (finding that
"the common-law rule [where loss of consortium does not exist in the parent-child
relationship] no longer fits the social realities of the present day," thus, rule al-
lowing parents to recover for loss of consortium of their children is "closer to our
present day family ideal"); see also Parker, supra note 16, at 3842 (chronicling early
cases discussing common law claim of loss of consortium); Perry, supra note 8, at
36 (finding that, as of 2003, expanding loss of consortium claim to parent-child
relationship is still relatively recent development).
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Prier.112 In Shockley, plaintiff parents Benjamin and Marion Shockley al-
112. 225 N.W. 2d 495, 499 (Wis. 1975) (concluding that parents now have
right to bring claims for loss of their children's consortium). In so finding, the
Shockley court noted, "the law should recognize the right of parents to recover for
loss of aid, comfort, society and companionship of a child during minority when
such loss is caused by the negligence of another." Id. (explaining policy behind
rights). Indeed, the emotional importance of the parent-child relationship is now
widely recognized, and as a consequence, the legal right of parental consortium
claims is steadily expanding. See, e.g., Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734
P.2d 991, 994-97 (Alaska 1987) (holding that minor children had independent
cause of action for loss of parental consortium resulting from injuries tortiously
inflicted on their parent by third party); Villareal v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 774
P.2d 213, 216-20 (Ariz. 1989) (finding that child can bring loss of consortium
claim resulting from father's death in motorcycle accident); Frank v. Superior
Court of Ariz., 722 P.2d 955, 958-60 (Ariz. 1986) (finding that parents have cause
of action for loss of consortium under Arizona law against third party who injures
their adult child); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 261-73 (Iowa 1981) (holding
that minor has independent cause of action in Iowa for loss of companionship of
parent who is tortiously injured by third party so as to cause significant disruption
of parent-child relationship), overruled by Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Ill.
Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Iowa 1983) (limiting child's damages
claim for loss of parental consortium to period of child's minority); Berger v.
Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 425 (Mich. 1981) (finding that child has independent
cause of action for loss of parental consortium when parent is negligently injured);
Lester v. Sayles, 850 S.W.2d 858, 871 (Mo. 1993) (holding most important consid-
eration in calculating damages owed to mother when daughter was injured in train
accident was mother's deprivation of enjoyment of daughter's consortium); Keele
v. St. Vincent Hosps. & Health Care Ctr., 852 P.2d 574, 576-78 (Mont. 1993) (hold-
ing that in Montana, minor child can establish claim for loss of parental consor-
tium by showing mental or physical impairment so severe that it causes parent-
child relationship to be destroyed or nearly destroyed); Davis v. Elizabeth Gen.
Med. Ctr., 548 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that parents were
entitled to award of $50,000 for loss of child's consortium under NewJersey law),
overruled by Tynan v. Curzi, 753 A.2d 187 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (overrul-
ing Davis insofar as it extends parents' right to recovery "beyond that permitted by
common law"); Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1057
(Ohio 1993) (holding that parent may recover damages in action against third-
party who causes physical injury to parent's minor child, for loss of consortium);
Norvell v. Cuyahoga County Hosp., 463 N.E.2d 111, 114-15 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that parents of minor child injured may recover compensation for loss of
child's consortium); Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1133-38 (Okla. 1990) (hold-
ing that minor children or incapacitated dependent children may maintain cause
of action for permanent loss of parental consortium when third party injures par-
ent); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 465-66 (Tex. 1990) (holding that chil-
dren may recover for loss of parental consortium when third party causes disabling
injuries to their parent); Hay v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 496 A.2d 939, 942 (Vt.
1985) (finding that minor child has right to sue for damages for loss of parental
consortium); Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp., 864 P.2d 921, 932-33 (Wash.
1993) (holding that recovery of damages by mother for impact son's medical inju-
ries had on mother-son relationship, among other things, was appropriate); Ue-
land v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 195 (Wash. 1984) (expanding loss of
consortium claim so that child has independent right of action for loss of parent's
consortium); Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830, 841 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that
any minor or physically or mentally handicapped child who is dependent on par-
ent may maintain cause of action for loss or impairment of parental consortium
against third person); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell CountyJoint Powers Fire Bd., 797
P.2d 1171, 1176 (Wyo. 1990) (finding that "minor children have independent
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leged loss of consortium of their son Paul due to negligent conduct during
Paul's birth that left him blind and disfigured. 1 13 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff could recover, reasoning that the traditional
claim allowing parents economic recovery for the loss of wages of their
injured children is not particularly relevant because "the family relation-
ship has changed. Society and companionship between parents and their
children are closer to our present day family ideal than the right of the
parents to the 'earning capacity during minority,' which once seemed so
important .... -114 In the modern world it is more rational to allow par-
ents to recover for the loss of enjoyment in shared experiences, society
and companionship of their children.
115
As authority to persuade courts to find loss of consortium claims valid
in the parent-child context, those arguing the matter have relied almost
exclusively by analogy on the loss of spousal consortium claim long recog-
nized at common law.1 16 Many have noted that under the language of this
traditional state law claim, virtually every aspect of the spousal relationship
applies equally to the parent-child relationship.' 1 7 The single exception is
claim for loss of parental consortium resulting from injuries tortiously inflicted on
their parent by third person"). But see Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Schultz, 855 A.2d
753, 755 (Pa. 2004) (finding no right to assert loss of parental consortium under
Pennsylvania law).
113. See Shockley, 225 N.W.2d at 496-97 (discussing facts of case).
114. Id. at 499 (reasoning that claim for loss of parental consortium should
now exist).
115. See id. (giving parents right to claim loss of parental consortium by anal-
ogy due to realities of modern day world). It is a fact of both modern psychological
and legal knowledge that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most im-
portant relationships, as one legal scholar has noted:
It is common knowledge that a parent who suffers serious physical or
mental injury is unable to give his minor children the parental care, train-
ing, love and companionship in the same degree as he might have but for
his injury ... when the vitally important parent-child relationship is im-
paired and the child loses the love, guidance and close companionship of
a parent, the child is deprived of something that is indeed valuable and
precious.
Parker, supra note 16, at 48 (describing harm to parent-child relationship when
parent is injured). Although California does not recognize a right to claim loss of
parental consortium, the California Supreme Court has observed:
Plaintiffs claim, viewed in the abstract and divorced from its surround-
ings, carries both logical and sympathetic appeal ... [c]ertain aspects of
[the] spousal relationship are similar to those of the parent-child rela-
tionship, and there can be little question of the reality of the loss suffered
by a child deprived of the society and care of its parent.
Id. (quoting Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 862 (Cal. 1977)) (discussing
claim for loss of spousal consortium as similar to child's claim for loss of parent's
consortium).
116. See Parker, supra note 16, at 48 (noting common source of argument to
recognize loss of parental consortium claim was well-recognized loss of spousal
consortium claim).
117. See id. (defining spousal consortium and chronicling analogy that estab-
lished parental consortium claims); Perry, supra note 8, at 36 (noting similarities
between loss of spousal consortium and loss of parental consortium claims).
596 [Vol. 52: p. 569
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss3/5
the aspect of sexual relations, which exists within the realm of the spousal
relationship, but not as between parents and children.' 18
By finding a loss of consortium claim to be feasible in the parent-child
context, courts have necessarily found spousal consortium extends beyond
the loss of sexual services, including elements of personal relationships
that provide emotional satisfaction and stability. 119 Thus, the aspects of
marriage that are protected by the Constitution in cases such as Griswold
and Maynard, largely shape the aspects of spousal consortium as well. 1 20
Courts that have interpreted the constitutional protection of marriage
in this manner have concluded that spousal consortium claims can be
properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.121 As the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania stated in Pahle v. Colebrookdale Township:
Though the [Supreme] Court has most often spoken of marriage
in connection with the right to privacy, we believe the Supreme
Court's language concerning the institution is equally apt when
applied to the Due Process rights implicated... [in loss of con-
118. See Perry, supra note 8, at 36 (noting latest expansion of loss of consor-
tium claims to parent-child relationship). Perry elaborates:
In recent years, some states have even expanded the claim for loss of
consortium beyond spouses, permitting suits where the injury of a child
damages the quality of enjoyment of the parent-child relationship.
Courts formerly refused to recognize such claims because, among other
reasons, they believed that an important element of the consortium claim
was the loss of sexual services. The fact that some courts have begun to
move beyond this view provides further support for the position that the
claim for loss of consortium need not be rooted in the duty of marital
services at all.
Id. (discussing loss of consortium claims); see also Parker, supra note 16, at 40-42
(tracking evolution of loss of consortium claim from one made only by husband
for economic loss of his wife, to one made by either spouse for emotional, social
and sexual loss of other, to one expanded as to children to recover for loss of
consortium of their negligently injured parent).
119. See Shockley, 225 N.W.2d at 497-99 (finding that "the common-law rule
[where loss of consortium does not exist in the parent-child relationship] no
longer fits the social realities of the present day" thus, rule allowing parents to
recover for loss of society of their children is "closer to our present day family
ideal"). For a further discussion of the expansion of the loss of consortium claim,
see supra notes 17-19, 23-26 and accompanying text.
120. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (holding that pri-
vate decisions by married couples, such as whether to use contraception, are pro-
tected by realm of sexual privacy in which government should not interfere);
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888) (describing marriage as "the most
important relation in life" and "the foundation of the family and of society, with-
out which there would be neither civilization nor progress"); Parker, supra note 16,
at 41-42 (defining spousal consortium as emotional, social, physical companion-
ship, society and support of one spouse to another).
121. See Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp., 227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 382 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (finding that logical extension of Supreme Court protection of marriage
relationship, in addition to Third Circuit holding claims for loss of parental con-
sortium proper under Section 1983, dictate that claims for loss of spousal consor-
tium under Section 1983 also proper).
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sortium claims under Section 1983]: marital integrity and spousal
association."
1 2 2
Therefore, consortium is already protected by the Constitution, and a
spouse, just as a parent, can rightly bring a loss of consortium claim under
Section 1983.123 Furthermore, any court that finds a constitutional right
to parental consortium should logically find a constitutional right to
spousal consortium. 124 Some of these courts, in defending their reason-
ing that a parental consortium right is protected by the Constitution while
a spousal consortium right is not, have claimed that they seek "neither to
minimize the loss of a family member nor to denigrate the fundamental
liberty interest in matters of family life that have long been a part of our
constitutional fabric."' 25 Unfortunately, these courts do exactly that; for
122. Id. (discussing marriage rights previously held by Supreme Court to be
protected by substantive due process).
123. See id. (finding that Supreme Court holdings protecting substantive due
process rights involving marriage protect spousal consortium as well). Several
courts, while not having expressly ruled on the issue of loss of spousal consortium
claims under Section 1983, have used language in holding the analogous parental
consortium claims valid. This strongly suggests spousal consortium claims under
Section 1983 would also be valid in these jurisdictions. See, e.g., Flores v. Cameron
County, 92 F.3d 258, 271 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Texas law to find loss of consor-
tium available under Section 1983 when spouse, parent, or child suffers actionable
non-fatal physical injury); Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 391 (5th Cir.
1992) ("Rhyne has standing to recover for her own injuries arising out of the wrong-
ful death of her son.") (emphasis added); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1422-
23 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that child can recover, as of date of his birth, under
Section 1983 for unwarranted interference with his fights to familial consortium
after unlawful shooting of father because of constitutional protection of family);
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding parent can re-
cover for loss of child's consortium under Section 1983 because allfamily relation-
ships are constitutionally protected), overruled by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th
Cir. 2005) (overruling Bell"insofar as it recognized a constitutional right to recover
for the loss of companionship of an adult child when that relationship is termi-
nated as an incidental result of state action"); Robinson v. Johnson, 975 F. Supp.
950, 954 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ("[P]arent may recover damages for 'mental anguish,
suffering and loss of companionship, contribution, society, affection and comfort'
in a [Section] 1983 action based on the violation of her child's civil rights that
resulted in his death.") (quoting Flores, 92 F.3d at 271).
124. See Pahle, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (finding that logical extension of Su-
preme Court protection of marriage relationship, in addition to Third Circuit
holding claims for loss of parental consortium proper under Section 1983, dictate
that claims for loss of spousal consortium under Section 1983 also proper). But see
Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 606 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (recognizing existing consti-
tutional right to parental consortium, but declining to expand to context of
spousal consortium); Wiers v. Barnes, 925 F. Supp. 1079, 1095-96 (D. Del. 1996)
(holding that "there is no authority to consider a loss of consortium claim deriving
from a claim of injury by an uninjured spouse brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983," despite Third Circuit holding that father can assert claim for loss of
child's consortium under Section 1983).
125. See Harbury, 233 F.3d at 606 (quoting Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 9 (1st
Cir. 1986)) (explaining that First Circuit declined to expand substantive constitu-
tional rights to protect spousal consortium).
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they fail to follow the protected parent-child relationship back to its histor-
ical origin, essentially striking a blow to the major role that the marriage
relationship plays in society.
12 6
B. Spousal Consortium as the Context for Parental Rights
Spousal consortium entitles each spouse to the "comfort, companion-
ship, and affection of the other."' 27 Without marital privacy, which in-
cludes the decision and desire to have children in the first place, the
parent-child relationship becomes either extinct or meaningless. 128 It
may be true that spousal consortium and marriage are not precisely the
same thing; in practice, however, a successful marriage cannot exist with-
out the previously named aspects of consortium, and without a successful
marriage, the attributes of the parent-child relationship courts seek to pro-
tect simply do not exist.' 29
Historically, the Supreme Court intended the constitutional rights of
having and raising children to be used within the context of marriage.' 30
126. For a further discussion of why marriage should come before children
not only in the traditional family chronology, but legally, as courts have historically
supported the traditional family unit and the stable family environment as the
ideal for raising children, see infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
127. Parker, supra note 16, at 41-42 (defining consortium as it applies in both
spousal and parental context).
128. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (holding realm of
marital privacy to be constitutionally protected). As Supreme Court Justice
Goldberg aptly put it in his concurring opinion in Griswold:
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly under-
lie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy
and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the
fundamental rights specifically protected.... The fact that no particular
provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State from disrupting
the traditional relation of the family-a relation as old and as fundamen-
tal as our entire civilization-surely does not show that the Government
was meant to have the power to do so. Rather, as the Ninth Amendment
expressly recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as this
one, which are protected from abridgment by the Government though
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution.
Id. at 495-96 (discussing constitutional basis of fundamental personal rights).
129. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983) (holding that mar-
riage is most desirable context to raise children). The Court in Lehr found that:
Varied state laws [that govern] marriage and divorce affect a multitude of
parent-child relationships. The institution of marriage has played a criti-
cal role both in defining the legal entitlements of family members and in
developing the decentralized structure of our democratic society. In rec-
ognition of that role, and as part of their general overarching concern for
serving the best interests of children, state laws almost universally express
an appropriate preference for the formal family.
Id. (discussing state laws that recognize marriage as important to family relation-
ship); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) ("No one disputes the
appropriateness of Illinois' concern with the family unit, perhaps the most funda-
mental social institution of our society.").
130. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (holding that marriage promotes way of life
desirable to society at large). The Lehr Court found marriage to be much more
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The Court has not promoted and protected the right to have children per
se. 13 1 Instead, the Court has historically promoted the raising of children
in a stable family environment. 13 2
In fact, courts have long viewed procreation as a primary purpose of
marriage. 133 Thus, at a time when out-of-wedlock births and divorces are
on the rise, and a decline has been detected in the incidence of two-par-
ent homes, the protection of marriage as the foundation of the traditional
than simply a legal status, for marriage is the foundation of families, which are
fundamentally important to our society:
[T]he mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent con-
stitutional protection. The actions of judges neither create nor sever ge-
netic bonds. "[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the
individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attach-
ments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the
role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of chil-
dren as well as from the fact of blood relationship."
Id. (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
844 (1977)) (describing critical role of family).
131. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (holding that having
biological offspring does not automatically confer parental rights). The Caban
Court also saw the importance of a marriage foundation in establishing parental
rights:
Even if it be assumed that each married parent after divorce has some
substantive due process right to maintain his or her parental relationship,
... it by no means follows that each unwed parent has any such right.
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.
Id. (finding that unwed parents may have less substantive rights in their children
than married parents). The Caban court further noted that the relationship be-
tween a father and biological child may acquire constitutional protection if the
father enters into a traditional marriage with the mother or if "the actual relation-
ship between father and child" is sufficient. See id. (noting that primary indicia of
parental relationship is participation in traditional family unit).
132. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256-57 (finding marriage to be foundation of those
family relationships desirable to society). The Lehr Court went on to note that
"[i]n some cases, however, this Court has held that the Federal Constitution super-
sedes state law and provides even greater protection for certain formal family rela-
tionships." Id. at 257 (explaining different levels of constitutional protections); see
In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 13940, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (noting that
government has interest in promoting stable families); Phyllis G. Bossin, Same-Sex
Unions: The New Civil Rights Struggle or an Assault on Traditional Marriage?, 40 TULSA
L. REv. 381, 390 (2005) (discussing how state interest in promoting stable families
creates rational basis for state bans on same-sex marriage).
133. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (holding that
"[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving
the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of
Genesis"); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (finding that
"our society as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for
procreation and the rearing of children"); Perry, supra note 8, at 30 (noting "there
are many cases that make it clear that courts have long viewed procreation as a
primary purpose of marriage").
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family is especially important. 13 4 As a matter of practice and policy, courts
should recognize a federal right to spousal consortium as an aspect of that
traditional family unit the Supreme Court has historically held to be con-
stitutionally protected, and is the very basis of our culture and society.' 35
C. Marriage as a Legal Status, Not an Amorphous Family Relationship
Some courts that fail to recognize an existing right to spousal consor-
tium under the Constitution and Section 1983 point to line drawing issues
regarding which of the many different types of intimate and familial rela-
tionships should be constitutionally protected.1 3 6 This argument states
134. See Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective, 9
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 291, 300-03 (2001) (stating desirability of marriage as con-
text to rear children). Another commentator has noted:
It is often argued that marriage is the most desirable context for the rear-
ing of children, and many argue that marriage is also the most beneficial
social arrangement for the well-being of adults based on arguments that it
provides economic protection and enhances physical and emotional well-
being.
Perry, supra note 8, at 34 n.125 (presenting arguments in favor of marriage); see
also Nat'l Ctr. for Policy Analysis: Idea House, supra note 10 (noting that "[als a
proportion of all households, married-couple households with children declined
from 40 percent to 26 percent between 1970 and 1990" and "the percentage of
single-parent families in the U.S. doubled between 1970 and 1990-from 6 per-
cent to 12 percent of all families and from 11 percent to 24 percent of all
households").
135. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977)
(discussing importance of constitutional protection of family relationships). The
Moore court noted that its "decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and
pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural." Id. (explaining
reason for constitutional protection of family relationship); see also Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (noting "Court's historical recognition that free-
dom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment") (summarizing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246, 255 (1978)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (empha-
sizing that "the traditional relation of the family . . . [is] a relation as old and as
fundamental as our entire civilization"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52
(1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of
family life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has
been found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly
granted Constitutional right."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944)
(recognizing history of Supreme Court decisions that have respected private realm
of family life that state cannot enter); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(finding Fourteenth Amendment protects freedom to marry, establish home and
bring up children).
136. See Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1986) (declining to expand
loss of consortium claims under Section 1983 to spousal context). The Ortiz court,
in justifying its decision, noted:
[T]he problem of giving definition and limits to a liberty interest in this
vast area seems not only exceedingly difficult but to a considerable extent
duplicative of the widespread existence of state causes of action, as in this
case, which provide some compensation to grieving relatives.... [W]e
emphasize that in denying a cause of action to appellants, we seek neither
2007] NOTE
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that the line as to what intimate relationships are protected by the Consti-
tution must be drawn somewhere, and while all family relationships are
important, the one between parents and children is the only one afforded
constitutional protection.1 3 7 Even within the context of this reasoning, rec-
ognizing spousal consortium as constitutionally protected does not pre-
sent any line drawing issues because marriage is a readily identified legal
status; one very clearly is or is not legally married.
138
Identifying the constitutional right to spousal consortium does not
imply that any other familial relationships should be protected. 13 9 While
to minimize the loss of a family member nor to denigrate the fundamen-
tal liberty interest in matters of family life that has long been a part of our
constitutional fabric .... [O]ur conclusion is simply that, in light of the
limited nature of the Supreme Court precedent in this area, it would be
inappropriate to extend recognition of an individual's liberty interest in
his or her family or parental relationship to the facts of this case.
Id. (explaining decision not to recognize loss of spousal consortium claim); see also
Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 606 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding no right to assert
loss of spousal consortium claim under Section 1983). The Harbury court thought
substantive constitutional rights must be delineated with precision:
Harbury's claim thus lies beyond Supreme Court precedent in not one
but two respects: it concerns neither a parent-child relationship nor pur-
poseful interference with a familial relationship. On the facts of this case,
therefore, we need not decide whether the constitutional right to contin-
uing familial association requires allegations of purpose to interfere with
the right, nor whether the constitutional right to familial association ex-
tends to the marriage relationship. We hold only that in view of Supreme
Court precedent and in light of the Court's admonition in Collins, we
cannot extend a constitutional right to familial association to cases where,
as here, the government has indirectly interfered with a spousal
relationship.
Id. (providing explanation for holding of case).
137. See Norcross v. Town of Hammonton, Civil No. 04-2536 (RBK), 2006 WL
1995021, at *3 (D.NJ. July 13, 2006) ("While the Supreme Court has recognized
constitutional protection for 'rights to marry, to have children, to direct the educa-
tion and upbringing of one's children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to
bodily integrity, and to abortion,' the Court has never sanctioned constitutional
protection of consortium.").
138. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model
for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204, 230 (1982) (summarizing marriage statutes).
Every state in the country requires that those seeking to marry apply for and sign a
marriage license. See HOMER H. CLARKs, THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES § 2.3 at 34-44 (2d ed. 1988) (providing jurisdictional summaries of
marriage laws, both statutory and common law). Through this requirement, the
state authorizes and registers the marriage. See id. (same). The couple's relation-
ship also becomes subject to state regulation with respect to legal duties and re-
sponsibilities the spouses are deemed to owe each other during the marriage. See
Baehr v. Levin, 852 P.2d 44, 47 (Haw. 1993) (holding that "marriage is a ... legal
status.., which gives rise to rights and benefits reserved exclusively to that particu-
lar relationship"), superseded by constitutional amendment, HAw. CONST. art. I, § 23
(granting legislature the "power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples"), as
recognized in Milberger v. KBHL, LLC, Civ. No. 05-00297 ACK/KSC, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12489, at *23 n.9 (D. Haw. Feb. 22, 2007).
139. See Norcross, 2006 WL 1995021, at *3 (explaining that Supreme Court has
never expressly found constitutional protection of spousal consortium).
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the relationships between siblings, cousins, grandparents and blended
families all lend themselves to a fact specific and difficult analysis of the
level of intimacy in a given relationship, this is not the case in the spousal
context.1 40 The nature of the relationship itself commands a particularly
high level of dependence and intimacy which is entered into voluntarily
and can be ended in the same manner. 141 As the Supreme Court stated in
Maynard,
[w]hen the contracting parties have entered into the married
state, they have not so much entered into a contract as into a new
relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not
upon their agreement, but upon the general law of the state, stat-
utory or common, which defines and prescribes those rights, du-
ties, and obligations. They are of law, not of contract .... The
reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it contin-
ues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none
other.142
Thus, the institution of marriage as a legal status preempts the need
for undertaking a case-by-case analysis of the level of intimacy present in a
particular marriage for the sake of loss of consortium claims.1 43 The con-
nection between the right to have children and the desire and decision to
have children is inevitable; courts have long recognized the government's
interest in promoting stable families. 44 Marriage is the most advanta-
geous environment in which to raise children for many practical reasons,
including income, benefits, support and emotional stability, and this fact is
recognized and promoted within the court system.' 45 If the right to have
140. See Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 8 (declining to expand loss of consortium claims
under Section 1983 to spousal context).
141. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59 (holding that legal duties of marriage can be
disavowed upon divorce).
142. 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480 (1863)).
143. See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (putting forth
Supreme Court policy that substantive constitutional rights are to be expanded
prudently); Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 606-07 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing need
for express Supreme Court holding that spousal consortium is constitutionally pro-
tected before loss of spousal consortium claims can be brought under Section
1983); Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 9 (requiring higher evidentiary showing by plaintiff be-
cause lack of express Supreme Court holding that spousal consortium is constitu-
tionally protected).
144. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983) (holding that mar-
riage is most desirable context to raise children because it is foundation of tradi-
tional family unit). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court authority
promoting the traditional and stable family, see supra notes 130-35 and accompa-
nying text.
145. See Editorial, Statistical Census Findings: Traditional Married Couples are Bet-
ter Off by Any Available Standard, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 15, 2001, available at http://
www.adherents.com/misc/marriage.html (finding that children are forty times
more likely to be abused by live-in boyfriends than their own parents); Robert E.
Rector et al., Increasing Marriage Would Dramatically Reduce Child Poverty, May 20,
2007] 603NOTE
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and raise children is important enough to be raised to the constitutional
level, spousal consortium should also be protected to preserve that right
the way the Supreme Court and society intend it to be used.
146
V. CONCLUSION
The ability to bring a loss of consortium claim in the Third Circuit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is important because while economic losses may be
recovered in the injured spouse's action, loss of consortium focuses on the
intangible, companionate aspects of marriage that are equally, if not more
important in the long term.1 4 7 Furthermore, while a state law claim for
loss of spousal consortium may be available, denial of the federal remedy
and higher consideration given to analogous loss of parental consortium
claims is not an appropriate result.1 48 When a federal civil rights action
2003, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/cda0306.cfm (finding child wel-
fare associated with marital status of parents). Rector and Johnson find that:
Children raised by never-married mothers are seven times more likely to
be poor when compared to children raised in intact married families.
The obvious nexus between single-parent families and child poverty has
led President George W. Bush to propose a new trial program aimed at
increasing child well-being and reducing child poverty by promoting
healthy marriage.
Id. (describing relationship between child poverty and marital status of parents);
see also Perry, supra note 8, at 34 n.125 ("It is often argued that marriage is the most
desirable context for the rearing of children.").
146. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256-57 (finding that state laws appropriately express
clear preference for formal family unit). The Lehr court went on to note that "in
some cases, however, this Court has held that the Federal Constitution supersedes
state law and provides even greater protection for certain formal family relation-
ships." Id. at 257 (explaining legal and social importance of formal family
relationships).
147. See Parker, supra note 16, at 41-42 (defining spousal consortium to in-
clude comfort, companionship and conjugal society of each spouse to other, ex-
plaining that interference with spouse's right to consortium violates not only
natural right but also spouse's legal right arising out of marriage relationship);
Perry, supra note 8, at 32 (discussing realm of sexual privacy that protects marriage
relationship).
148. SeeSmith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1417-20 (9th Cir. 1987) ("We
now hold that this constitutional interest in familial companionship and society
logically extends to protect children from unwarranted state interference with
their relationships with their parents."), overruled in part by Hodgers-Durgin v. De
La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (overruling Nava v. City of Dublin,
121 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1997), which relied on Smith; Nava held that that "a
plaintiff had standing to seek injunctive relief barring the California Highway Pa-
trol's use of chokeholds"); Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 509 n.7
(3d Cir. 1985) (holding that father of child had "cognizable liberty interest in
preserving the life and physical safety of his child from deprivations caused by state
action, a right that logically extends from his recognized liberty interest in the
custody of his children and the maintenance and integrity of the family"); Bell v.
City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1242-48 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that parent
whose child has died as result of unlawful state action may maintain action under
Section 1983 for deprivation of liberty), overruled by Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th
Cir. 2005) (overruling Bell "insofar as it recognized a constitutional right to recover
604 [Vol. 52: p. 569
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exists, a plaintiff is not required to exhaust all state judicial or administra-
tive remedies prior to pursuing the federal claim. 149 Practical considera-
tions such as the expertise, time and resources available in federal court
should be available for both civil rights injuries under Section 1983 and
the loss of consortium claims that arise from the same incident.1 50 If a
federal remedy is not provided for loss of spousal consortium claims under
Section 1983, victims are forced to choose between consolidating and
bringing all claims in state court, or splitting up claims between state and
federal court, which inevitably increases the cost, time and labor devoted
to be made whole.1 5
1
for the loss of companionship of an adult child when that relationship is termi-
nated as an incidental result of state action").
149. See, e.g., McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963) (finding
that purposes of Civil Rights Act include overriding certain kinds of state laws,
providing remedy where state law was inadequate and providing federal remedy
where state remedy was not available in practice); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
183-84 (1961) (holding that federal remedy provided by Section 1983 is supple-
mentary to state, but state remedy, if any, need not be first sought before federal
one is invoked), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) ("[W]e now overrule Monroe v. Pape... insofar as it holds
that local governments are wholly immune from suit under § 1983."); Lane v. Wil-
son, 307 U.S. 268, 274-75 (1939) (stating plaintiff not required to pursue state
procedure for determining claim of discrimination before commencing action in
federal court for damages under federal statute); City of Fontana, 818 F.2d at 1414-
15 (finding that actions which violate substantive protections of Constitution will
give rise to civil rights action regardless of existence or exhaustion of state rem-
edy); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[Defendant's] con-
tention that [plaintiffs] action was defeated because she failed to exhaust her state
remedies is ... legally frivolous. She was not required to exhaust her judicial or
administrative remedies before she brought her civil rights action.").
150. Compare Patsy v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that traditionally, when complaining party seeks federal court review of state
action, considerations of federalism require exhaustion of state relief before inter-
vention of federal judiciary into dispute where no original federal jurisdiction ex-
ists), with St. Joseph Hosp., A Div. of Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word v.
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 573 F. Supp. 443, 450-51 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (holding that
generally administrative remedies need not be exhausted as prerequisite to action
brought under civil rights law such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Additionally, there are
varying situations in which a federal forum would be preferable to its state counter-
part. See, e.g., Carter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 983 F.2d 40, 43 (5th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing Texas statute that prohibited trial court from taxing costs against intervenor in
third party action was "displaced" by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Bosse v.
Litton Unit Handling Sys., 646 F.2d 689, 695 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding that federal
district court is bound to follow state law regarding taxation of costs in diversity
cases only when federal law is silent).
151. See Ann Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 VAND. L. REv. 953,
955 (1991) (finding that state courts may not equal federal courts in expertise in
federal law as well as enthusiasm for federal rights). Althouse notes that Justice
Stevens finds that "federal courts 'have a primary obligation to protect the rights of
the individual that are embodied in the Federal Constitution' [and] generally
should not eschew this responsibility based on some diffuse, instrumental concern
for state autonomy." Id. at 954 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 28 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996)) (describing role of federal courts); see also RobertJ. Witte,
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United States Representative Marilyn Musgrave has said that
"[w]ithout traditional marriage, it is hard to see how our community will
be able to thrive."'1 52 With an institution so important to our culture, it is
plain to see why the Supreme Court has been explicitly protecting the
marriage relationship since 1888.153 It has been said that rights and reme-
dies should be equal, and courts should strive to create legal recourse in
which the remedy is no narrower than the substantive right that invokes
it.1 5 4 Marriage is truly the foundation of society as the Supreme Court has
so held, and the Third Circuit should find that a federal remedy for loss of
spousal consortium claims is not only appropriate, but is necessary.
15 5
Michelle N. Ferreri
... Or Would You Rather Have What's Behind Door Number Two? Uniform Choice of Law
Proposals: Big Deal of the Day or Just Another Zonk?, 59 J. AIR L. & CoM. 617, 652
(1993) (explaining that consolidating claims in federal court allows utilization of
federal expertise away from parochial interests of states). Unfortunately, splitting
claims between federal and state court is a likely outcome for spouses who wish to
pursue the initial civil rights claim in federal court, because consolidation tools
such as pendent party jurisdiction are frequently unavailable in these situations.
See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553-55 (1989) (reaffirming Supreme
Court's unwillingness to apply pendent party jurisdiction in wrongful death ac-
tion), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089, as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S.
546, 556 (2003); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375-76
(1978) (limiting scope of pendent party jurisdiction, barring plaintiff in diversity
action to append non-diverse parties); Stallworth v. City of Cleveland, 893 F.2d
830, 838 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding pendent party jurisdiction does not reach
spouse's claim for loss of consortium under Section 1983, so claim cannot be
brought in federal court).
152. See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage:
Before S. Comm. On Judiciary, 108th Cong. 18 (2004) (statement of Rep. Marilyn
Musgrave, Member, House of Reps.) (quoting Rev. Richard Richardson) (propos-
ing that Federal Marriage Amendment to Constitution is necessary to protect tradi-
tional marriage in addition to expressly prohibiting gay marriage).
153. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888) (describing marriage
as "the most important relation in life" and "the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress").
154. See DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQuITY-RESTITUTION § 1.2, at 3 (2d
ed., 1973) (finding congruence between rights and remedies important in selec-
tion of remedy); Parker, supra note 16, at 49-50 (noting that "[c]ourts, as nearly as
possible, seek to maintain a careful and delicate balance between substantive rights
and corresponding remedies").
155. See Pahle v. Colebrookdale Twp., 227 F. Supp. 2d 361, 381 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (holding that rights existing in Third Circuit between parents and children
logically extend to spouses, so spouse can assert loss of consortium claim under
Section 1983 in light of Supreme Court precedent protecting marriage
relationship).
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